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Advisory Opinions and the Problem of
Legal Authority
Christian R. Burset*
The prohibition against advisory opinions is fundamental to our
understanding of federal judicial power, but we have misunderstood its origins.
Discussions of the doctrine begin not with a constitutional text or even a court
case, but a letter in which the Jay Court rejected President Washington’s request
for legal advice. Courts and scholars have offered a variety of explanations for
the Jay Court’s behavior. But they all depict the earliest Justices as responding
to uniquely American concerns about advisory opinions.
This Article offers a different explanation. Drawing on previously
untapped archival sources, it shows that judges throughout the anglophone
world—not only in the United States but also in England and British India—
became opposed to advisory opinions in the second half of the eighteenth
century. The death of advisory opinions was a global phenomenon, rooted in a
period of anxiety about common-law authority.
Early modern English judges had routinely advised the Crown. This
advisory role was politically fraught but doctrinally unproblematic thanks to a
jurisprudential orthodoxy that treated judges’ opinions as evidence of a
preexisting common law. Although this declaratory theory survived into the
nineteenth century (and beyond), it began to fragment after 1750, as lawyers
began to disagree about the nature of precedent. Those disagreements generated
new pressure to clarify the weight of different kinds of legal authority. Most
lawyers intuited that advisory opinions were less authoritative than decisions
arising from litigation. But because bench and bar lacked a common theory of
legal authority, they were unable to articulate a shared understanding of what
respect was due to judges’ extrajudicial pronouncements. As a result, advisory
opinions became dangerous, because the judges who issued them could not
*
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various stages of this project, the author thanks Akhil Amar, Will Baude, A.J. Bellia, Sadie
Blanchard, Ben Brady, Sam Bray, Chris Casey, Bill Casto, Christine Chabot, Patrick Corrigan,
Barry Cushman, Maria Maciá, Gregory Mark, Marah McLeod, Zvi Rosen, Max Stearns, Jay
Tidmarsh, Chas Tyler, David Waddilove, and Lael Weinberger. This Article also benefited from
feedback at the Notre Dame Law School faculty workshop and the Chicagoland Junior
Scholars Conference. Sophia Aguilar, Natalie Fulk, Thomas Hellenbrand, David Spicer, and
Nikolai Stieglitz provided helpful research assistance. Brandy Ellis of the Kresge Law Library
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621

622

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3:621

control how future readers might treat them. In response, judges sought to limit
their advisory activity—first in England, then in British-controlled Bengal, and
finally in the United States, whose judges inherited Britain’s contested and
dynamic understanding of the judicial role.
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INTRODUCTION
The rule against advisory opinions has been described as “the
oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability,”1
but its pedigree is doubtful. Discussions of the doctrine begin not with
the Constitution’s text or even a landmark case, but a four-sentence
letter from 1793 in which the Jay Court rejected the Washington
Administration’s request for advice on questions of international law.2
1.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (quoting CHARLES WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 34
(1963)); accord RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 52 (7th ed.
2015); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844 (2001).
2.
Letter from U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 5 THE SELECTED
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 545, 545 (Elizabeth M. Nuxoll ed., 2017) [hereinafter JAY PAPERS].
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Courts and commentators have conventionally read that letter as
declaring advisory opinions to be unconstitutional,3 but some scholars
have questioned that understanding.4 The Constitution never mentions
advisory opinions, which English judges had routinely issued.
Therefore, the revisionists argue, the Jay Court’s refusal to provide the
requested opinions reflected prudential or political concerns, not
constitutional ones.5
These accounts offer starkly different interpretations of what
has become known as the Correspondence of the Justices. But they agree
in treating the Jay Court’s letter as a uniquely American event that
responded to distinctively American concerns. This Article disagrees.
Drawing on previously untapped archival sources, it shows that judges
throughout the common-law world—not only in the United States but
also in Britain and its empire—turned against advisory opinions during
the second half of the eighteenth century. The demise of advisory
opinions was a global phenomenon that requires a transnational
explanation. This Article supplies one.
During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, judges
routinely provided legal advice to the Crown. This advisory role was
politically fraught but doctrinally unproblematic thanks to a
jurisprudential orthodoxy that treated judges’ opinions as evidence of a
preexisting law.6 Although this declaratory conception of the law
survived into the nineteenth century (and beyond), it began to fragment
shortly before the American Revolution, as judges and lawyers started
to disagree in subtle ways about the nature of precedent. Those
disagreements generated new pressure to clarify the weight of different
kinds of legal authority. Lawyers intuited that advisory opinions were
less authoritative than opinions accompanying judgments. But because
bench and bar lacked a common theory of legal authority, they were
unable to articulate a shared understanding of exactly what respect was
due to judges’ extrajudicial pronouncements. As a result, judges began
to worry that readers might invest advisory opinions with the wrong

3.
See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 176 (2016) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 781 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 191–92 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (per curiam); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
337 U.S. 582, 647–48 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,
354 (1911); United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 301 (1909); infra Section III.C.
4.
For overviews of the literature, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 12–14 (1985); and FALLON ET AL., supra note 1,
at 52–53.
5.
See infra Sections IV.B and IV.C (discussing scholarly views on the rationale for the Jay
Court’s refusal to provide advisory opinions).
6.
See infra Part II.
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kind of authority. In response, judges sought to limit their advisory
activity—first in England, then in British-controlled Bengal, and finally
in the United States, whose judges inherited Britain’s contested and
dynamic understanding of the judiciary.7
This Article begins with an overview of current scholarship (Part
I). It then gives a narrative history of the advisory role of early modern
English judges, during what some scholars have termed the “classical”
era of the common law (Part II). Although judges had a duty to provide
the Crown with legal advice, they also worried that their role as royal
advisors might compromise their duty to declare the law impartially. In
response, they developed procedural norms meant to reconcile their
judicial and advisory roles.
Part III turns to the second half of the eighteenth century, when
judges stopped or tried to stop giving advisory opinions. It begins with
Sackville’s Case (1760), which is generally considered the last advisory
opinion given to the Crown by English judges.8 Although legal
historians and constitutional lawyers have long looked to that case to
illuminate the American approach to advisory opinions,9 this Article
offers a new interpretation that challenges the prevailing theory of why
English judges curtailed their advisory activity. The story then moves
to Calcutta, which served as the capital of Britain’s emerging empire in
South Asia. Starting in 1775, that city was home to a royally chartered
Supreme Court of Judicature (“SCJ”). Although the SCJ departed from
English practice in many respects, its justices understood their role as
analogous to that of English judges.10 The SCJ’s first chief justice, Sir
Elijah Impey, had been a respected litigator and municipal judge in
England.11 Sir Robert Chambers, one of the SCJ’s first puisne justices,
had succeeded Sir William Blackstone as the Vinerian Professor at
Oxford.12 The other two justices had each been a barrister in England
for more than a decade.13 These men expressly tried to emulate English

7.
See infra Part III.
8.
But cf. infra Appendix (noting a possible exception).
9.
See, e.g., 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 214 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987); see also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 29 n.11 (1955) (Reed, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he case could hardly have escaped the notice of the members of the
Constitutional Convention.”).
10. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 281–90 (2010).
11. B.N. PANDEY, THE INTRODUCTION OF ENGLISH LAW INTO INDIA: THE CAREER OF ELIJAH
IMPEY IN BENGAL, 1774-1783, at 39–40 (1967); T.H. Bowyer, Impey, Sir Elijah (1732–1809), in
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds., 2004)
[hereinafter DNB].
12. THOMAS M. CURLEY, SIR ROBERT CHAMBERS: LAW, LITERATURE, AND EMPIRE IN THE AGE
OF JOHNSON 69 (1998).
13. PANDEY, supra note 11, at 38–39.
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practice concerning advisory opinions.14 The value of studying their
behavior is not that it directly influenced American views but that it
offers a rare opportunity to study eighteenth-century conceptions of
judicial power in the context of a newly created court. Part III concludes
by briefly retelling the better-known actions of the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1793.
Part IV uses this historical narrative to reevaluate existing
explanations for the Correspondence. Although each of those theories is
partly correct, they cannot account for the decline of advisory opinions
as a global phenomenon. Part V proposes an explanation that can. It
argues that the demise of advisory opinions reflected a crisis of
common-law authority. The Part begins by describing that crisis, before
using it to explain judges’ behavior in England, British-controlled
Bengal, and the United States. In all three jurisdictions, judges avoided
or tried to avoid giving advisory opinions in response to growing
concerns about their being treated as excessively authoritative.
The Conclusion explores some implications of this historical
argument. We shouldn’t expect federal courts to start issuing advisory
opinions any time soon. Although they would have been permitted at
the Founding, they were always optional; and courts’ consistent
practice of rejecting them merits respect.15 Indeed, one contribution of
this Article is not to destabilize current practices but to make sense of
doctrines that now seem conceptually incoherent. For example, some
scholars have argued that the Supreme Court’s justiciability doctrines
fit uneasily with its practical focus on expounding the Constitution.16
Why worry about whether a case is moot, for example, when the case is
only a vehicle for declaring constitutional law? But that tension
14. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. For example, Justice Stephen Caesar
Lemaistre defended his refusal to give one advisory opinion by citing the conduct of English judges
in cases involving general warrants. Letter from J. Stephen Caesar Lemaistre to Warren Hastings
(Nov. 22, 1776), Add. Ms. 29137, at 476, 479v–480r (on file with the British Library). He explained
that although those judges condemned the practice when its legality was challenged in litigation,
they “never wantonly and extrajudicially took up that question of their own accord.” Id.
15. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1816–17 (2015) (arguing that even if advisory opinions
would have been permitted at the Founding, subsequent historical practice has created a
constitutional rule against them); John F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper Clause and Its
Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1376 (2012) (reviewing GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER
CLAUSE (2010)) (“[T]hough it was unobvious at the outset whether Article III courts could properly
issue advisory opinions, a practical construction of Article III gave rise to a decisive constitutional
prohibition against that practice.”); Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive
and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
535, 554–55 (2016) (describing the prohibition on judicial issuance of advisory opinions as a
historical practice that has hardened into a constitutional rule).
16. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
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evaporates when one realizes that the Court’s avoidance of advisory
opinions—the root of all justiciability doctrines—was actually an effort
to avoid misleading declarations of law. Justiciability doctrines do not
just constrain the Court’s law-declaration function; they also protect it.
The Conclusion also highlights a methodological intervention.
Historically minded scholars of federal courts have often traced the
narrow path running from England to the early United States.
Expanding the scope of inquiry to include other common-law
jurisdictions, including British India, allows us to consider new
evidence that might shed light on otherwise intractable problems.
*

*

*

Before continuing, it might be helpful to clarify a crucial term.
This Article defines advisory opinion as a legal opinion delivered by one
or more judges in their official capacities but outside of the ordinary
process of litigation.17 Traditionally, advisory opinions were issued by
judges, not by courts.18 (In England, advisory opinions were typically
issued by the twelve judges of the superior courts of common law—
King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer.19) Accordingly, advisory
opinions did not invoke a court’s power to issue a binding judgment.20
This definition excludes some practices that are sometimes
lumped with advisory opinions. First, it excludes advice that judges
give in private. That reflects a distinction that judges themselves
have historically drawn.21 Talking about the law behind closed
17. For other possible definitions, see Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability:
The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 643–51 (1992).
18. Today, three states have provisions that describe courts, rather than their justices, as
advice-givers. These provisions were enacted in 1886 (Colorado), 1889 (South Dakota), and 1962
(Michigan). MEL A. TOPF, A DOUBTFUL AND PERILOUS EXPERIMENT: ADVISORY OPINIONS, STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, at xiv–xv, 21–25 (2011).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra notes 210–211 and accompanying text; see also Letter from John Jay, Sup. Ct.,
C.J., to James Iredell, Sup. Ct., J. (Sept. 15, 1790), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES
IREDELL 292, 294 (Griffith John McRee ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857) (draft of letter from
U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. to George Washington, referring to “the distinction between a Court and
its Judges”).
21. See Maeva Marcus, Separation of Powers in the Early National Period, 30 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 269, 273 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court has historically distinguished advisory
opinions by the Court as an institution from the giving of advice by Justices on an individual basis).
For instance, Chief Justice Jay had no objection to offering legal advice in private letters to
President Washington, even though he declined to join a public letter in 1793. See, e.g., Letter from
John Jay to George Washington (Aug. 28, 1790), in 5 JAY PAPERS, supra note 2, at 270. Justice
Frankfurter, who campaigned against advisory opinions as a professor and as a Justice, see infra
Part I, nonetheless gave frequent advice to the Roosevelt Administration. William R. Casto,
Advising Presidents: Robert Jackson and the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1,
80 (2012). English judges also observed this distinction. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Dundas, Home
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doors might raise ethical issues, but it has not usually raised
constitutional concerns.22
Second, my definition excludes certified questions—questions of
law on which one court seeks guidance from another court or its judges.
Again, this distinction reflects historical practice. English judges
regularly advised other courts, even after they stopped giving advisory
opinions to the Crown.23 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has been
authorized to answer certified questions from circuit courts since
1802, a practice that never seems to have triggered concerns about
Article III.24
Finally, my definition excludes advisory activity that functioned
as appellate review. This includes, for example, advice to the Crown
about the legality of court-martial verdicts, which persisted into the
nineteenth century.25 Although those opinions were technically
extrajudicial, they effectively served as appeals from judgments that
would otherwise have been unreviewable in common-law courts.26
Sec’y, to Lord Loughborough, C.J. of Common Pleas (Sept. 12, 1792), GD51/1/20/3, Melville Papers
(on file with National Records of Scotland) (describing a request for an opinion as “personally to
yourself,” when there had been “no formal Reference to the Judges”).
22. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 36 (1998) (“[T]here is no formal constitutional prohibition on federal
judges giving advice pertaining to legal matters . . . .”).
23. See, e.g., Sutton v. Johnstone (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1215; 1 Term. Rep. 493 (reporting advice
from the chief justices of Common Pleas and King’s Bench to the Lord Chancellor in his capacity
as judge of Exchequer Chamber); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452–53 (discussing
the practice of referring cases from Chancery to judges of King’s Bench or Common Pleas to obtain
their opinions on questions of law ); J.H. Baker, Ascertainment of Foreign Law: Certification to and
by English Courts Prior to 1861, 28 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 141 (1979); Stewart Jay, Servants of
Monarchs and Lords: The Advisory Role of Early English Judges, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 193
(1994) (discussing judges’ advice to the House of Lords).
24. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156, 159; see, e.g., G. Edward White, The Working
Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1, 20–22 (1984) (describing the Marshall
Court’s enthusiasm for certification). The practice quietly died in the twentieth century. See Aaron
Nielson, The Death of the Supreme Court’s Certified Question Jurisdiction, 59 CATH. U. L. REV.
483, 484–85 (2010).
25. See James Oldham, Informal Lawmaking in England by the Twelve Judges in the Late
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 181, 189 & n.35 (2011); see also
JOHN NOORTHOUCK, A NEW HISTORY OF LONDON, INCLUDING WESTMINSTER AND SOUTHWARK 471–
74 (London, R. Baldwin 1773) (describing an opinion given in 1769 about the wording of a death
warrant); Chantal Stebbings, The Appeal By Way of Case Stated from the Determinations of
General Commissioners of Income Tax: An Historical Perspective, 1996 BRIT. TAX REV. 611, 612–
13 (describing the “case stated” procedure used to review tax-commission decisions).
26. Court-martial sentences had to be approved by the king, who had discretion to abrogate
them for any reason. See CHARLES JAMES, A COLLECTION OF THE CHARGES, OPINIONS, AND
SENTENCES OF GENERAL COURTS MARTIAL, at x & n.* (London, T. Egerton 1820). By the late
eighteenth century, he typically followed the advice of his judges or law officers when considering
challenges to sentences’ legality. See id. (describing an instance in which the king abrogated a
court-martial sentence based on the advice of the twelve judges). Commentators sometimes
described this process as an appeal. See JOHN DELAFONS, A TREATISE ON NAVAL COURTS MARTIAL
290 (London, P. Steel 1805). There was even some suggestion that such an appeal was of right in
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These exclusions might strike you as gerrymandered, but their
coherence will become clear as the Article unfolds. For now, it’s enough
to note that all three categories dodged the problem that afflicted true
advisory opinions: the problem of uncertain legal authority.27
I. EXPLAINING THE CORRESPONDENCE
This Article builds on a rich body of scholarship, and it might be
helpful to begin by laying out the current state of play. Until now, there
have been three main theories about the Jay Court’s actions in 1793:
that the Constitution forbids advisory opinions; that the
Correspondence was a prudential effort to advance certain policy aims,
such as augmenting the credibility of the United States in foreign
affairs; or that the Justices wanted to avoid giving an opinion that
would politically hurt the Court or its members.
The orthodox story, reflected in Supreme Court doctrine, is that
advisory opinions would violate “the separation of powers prescribed by
the Constitution.”28 Many scholars have agreed. Then-professor Felix
Frankfurter wrote in 1930 that the Justices must have determined that
“the giving of such opinions would not be a proper exercise of the
‘judicial power’ ” conferred by Article III.29 Later commentators have
elaborated on that reading.30 Extrajudicial advice is, as the name
suggests, extrajudicial, in the sense of reaching beyond judges’
proper role.31
capital cases. See John Scott [later Lord Chancellor Eldon], Opinion of the Solicitor General (Oct.
18, 1792), in 1 JOHN MCARTHUR, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF NAVAL AND MILITARY COURTS
MARTIAL 434, 435 (London, J. Butterworth 2d ed. 1805) (“I think the prisoner might reasonably be
thought entitled to have the opinion of his Majesty’s judges . . . . [I]n a case affecting the life of the
subject, it is usual to give the subject the protection which he can find only in their wisdom . . . .”).
On the obstacles to direct review of court-martial verdicts, see Richard D. Rosen, Civilian Courts
and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-Martial, 108 MIL. L. REV. 5,
14–18 (1985).
27. See infra note 311.
28. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
29. Felix Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, National, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 475, 476 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1930); see also Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir,
Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 527, 543–44 (describing
Justice Frankfurter’s enthusiasm for the case-or-controversy requirement).
30. E.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any “Dear John” Letters:
Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 478 (1998) (reviewing STEWART JAY,
MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997)); see also James E.
Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1, 41 (2008) (accepting the separation-of-powers story, but adding that “workload
and compensation concerns may have strengthened the Justices’ resolve”).
31. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 700 (1997) (“[T]he judicial power to decide cases
and controversies does not include the provision of purely advisory opinions . . . .”); Note, Advisory
Opinions and the Influence of the Supreme Court over American Policymaking, 124 HARV. L. REV.
2064, 2064 (2011) (summarizing this view).
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Although that doctrinal account remains dominant in the courts,
recent historiography has been skeptical of it. One alternative
explanation has focused on the practical disadvantages of advisory
opinions. Here, too, the trail starts with Professor Frankfurter.
Although he framed advisory opinions as constitutionally forbidden, he
also defended the Correspondence as helping to ensure “legislative and
popular responsibility” for policymaking.32 Moreover, he argued,
advisory opinions led to worse decisions by forcing judges to consider
legislation outside of its real-life context.33
Frankfurter did not connect this policy argument to the Justices’
concerns in 1793, but more recent scholarship has offered a historically
grounded approach that focuses on the specific questions the
Washington Administration wanted to ask. The issue in 1793 was not
whether the Justices would issue an opinion but whether they would
issue an opinion about the law of nations. As Professors Golove and
Hulsebosch have argued, the young republic was trying to establish its
credibility as a “civilized nation” that could be trusted to meet its
obligations under international law.34 To succeed, the United States
had to convince foreign audiences that it could faithfully determine
what those obligations entailed. Perhaps the Justices believed “that the
judiciary could more effectively establish the good faith of the nation in
administering the law of nations—and thus boost the credibility of the
government—if it drew sharp lines separating itself from the more
politically oriented executive branch.”35 In other words, the Jay Court
avoided advisory opinions because foreign observers would find them
less credible than pronouncements issued in the course of strictly
judicial activities.
The foreign affairs context also plays a central role in the third
category of explanation, which emphasizes the Justices’ domestic
political priorities. Professor Casto argues that Chief Justice Jay
thought that he was doing the President a favor by rejecting his request.
Forcing the executive to rely on its own interpretation of the law of
nations would strengthen the President’s role in foreign affairs, while
also boosting the position of Alexander Hamilton in the cabinet—both
of which were congenial to the Federalist politics of the early Justices.36
32. Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1007 (1924).
33. Id. at 1003.
34. David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
932 (2010).
35. Id. at 1027.
36. WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING
SAIL 117–21 (2006).

630

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3:621

Professor Arlyck also focuses on the Justices’ desire to shift
responsibility to the President. The Correspondence, he argues, “was an
attempt to define the fraught territory of foreign relations as an area of
executive, not judicial, responsibility.”37
The most sustained argument in this vein has been that of
Professor Jay, who argues that the refusal of 1793 “was neither
inevitable nor necessary under the contemporary understanding of the
constitutional role of judges.”38 Instead, it reflected two contingent
political concerns. First, the Washington Administration had asked
specifically for an opinion about a treaty; and Chief Justice Jay, a
Federalist, was eager to bolster “the President’s independence in
foreign affairs.”39 Second, the Court had an interest in “avoiding public
controversy.”40 The Justices wanted Congress to abolish their onerous
circuit-riding duties, and their contentious decision in Chisolm v.
Georgia41 had already made them some enemies. Accordingly, the
Justices eschewed advisory opinions in favor of other genres—such as
“informal advice, grand jury charges, dictum in opinions, and decisions
in actual cases”—that let them broadcast their views through less
politically charged channels.42
Importantly, all these explanations describe the Correspondence
as a uniquely American event—one that responded to the novel
imperatives of Article III or the distinctive political situation of the
Founding generation. The one exception is Professor Jay, whose work
observes that advisory opinions also happened to disappear in England
in the later eighteenth century. Professor Jay attributes this to the
goals of Lord Mansfield, the influential Lord Chief Justice at the time
of Sackville’s Case. Jay argues that although Mansfield was happy to
advise the Crown, he wanted to be known publicly “as a man outside
party politics.”43 Accordingly, he had little to gain from “highly visible”
written opinions, when his positions as a member of cabinet and in the
House of Lords gave him other means of influence.44 Ironically,
however, Professor Jay’s comparative perspective actually reinforces
American exceptionalism by depicting the actions of both chief justices
as driven by local political concerns. Moreover, none of these
explanations account for the fate of advisory opinions in common-law
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Kevin Arlyck, The Courts and Foreign Affairs at the Founding, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1, 23.
STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 8 (1997).
Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 161.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
JAY, supra note 38, at 167.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 44–45.
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colonies outside of the future United States. The next three Parts will
consider whether such an approach is tenable.
II. ADVICE-GIVING UNDER THE CLASSICAL COMMON LAW
Until the late eighteenth century, English judges routinely
advised the Crown on legal questions. This Part explains the role of
advisory opinions under what has been described as the “classical”
common law—the jurisprudence that became orthodox during the
seventeenth century.45
Medieval and early modern judges routinely gave legal advice to
monarchs.46 This reflected a jurisprudential and political framework
that imagined judges as both servants of the Crown and oracles of the
law.47 Judges’ oaths required that they “lawfully . . . counsel the King
in his Business.”48 In other words, advisory opinions were part of a
judge’s duty.49 This notion of judicial service was complemented by a
conception of judges as oracles.50 Medieval and early modern judges did
not see themselves as making law. Instead, the “law existed before any
attempts to express it,” and a judge’s task “was to find that existing law
and make it known.”51 Scholars have offered various theories about the
source of that preexisting law, including natural law, communal
custom, and the shared understanding of the profession.52 For now,
45. See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 157 (2002) (“Classical common law jurisprudence was articulated by
reflective but politically engaged jurists in the 17th century.”); cf. David J. Ibbetson, Case-Law and
Doctrine: A Historical Perspective on the English Common Law, in RICHTERRECHT UND
RECHTSFORTBILDUNG IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 27, 29 (Reiner Schulze &
Ulrike Seif eds., 2003) (describing an “early modern” common law that existed from the sixteenth
through late eighteenth centuries).
46. See JAY, supra note 38, at 10–50.
47. See JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW, at xi (1994); Jay, supra note 23, at 128–
52 (describing judges as “Servants of Monarchs”).
48. OATH OF THE JUSTICES (1346), in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 305, 305 (Alexander
Luders ed., London, Dawsons of Pall Mall 1963) (1810). The statute prescribing the oath remained
in force into the nineteenth century. See, e.g., In re Serjeants at Law (1839) 133 Eng. Rep. 74, 76
n.2; 6 Bing. (N.C.) 187, 192 n.2; FIFTH REPORT OF HER MAJESTY’S COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL
LAW 21 (London, W. Clowes & Sons 1840) (describing the judge’s oath to serve the king as
originating during the reign of King Edward III).
49. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 151–52 (2008).
50. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 (referring to judges as “depositary
of the laws; the living oracles”).
51. Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone’s Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1553,
1557 (2009).
52. See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices’ Most Significant Opinion,
29 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 173, 204–05 (2002) (“In administering the common law, a judge’s duty was
to identify and apply those principles preexisting in nature.”); William A. Fletcher, The General
Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1984) (describing the early nineteenth-century view that the general
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what matters is that the declaratory theory made it easy to make sense
of what advisory opinions did. They—like opinions given during
litigation—served as evidence of a preexisting law.53
That was the theory. But by the seventeenth century,
contemporaries recognized the possible tension between judges’ two
roles.54 As the Stuart monarchs learned, it could be useful for a king to
persuade his judges to issue favorable opinions on controversial
subjects.55 This temptation was particularly strong when judges served
at the pleasure of the king. But even after the Glorious Revolution,
when judges’ tenures had become more secure, commentators continued
to worry that a tyrannical executive might use extrajudicial opinions to
shield corrupt or unconstitutional actions.56 Even in the 1760s, Sir
Michael Foster described “tak[ing] the Opinion of the Judges” as “a
Refuge constantly open to a corrupt Administration.”57
Political pressure was not the only concern. Although judges
were oracles of the law, they were accustomed to speaking with the help
of their priests—that is, the bar.58 During the Middle Ages, the common
law was thought to reside not in the declarations of judges alone but in
the common opinion shared by the legal profession as a whole.59 By the
seventeenth century, this notion of the law as communis opinio had
started to weaken, but courts continued to rely on barristers as crucial

common law existed by “common practice and consent among a number of sovereigns”); Caleb
Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 931–35
(2013) (discussing the nature and sources of unwritten law); Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 527, 532–34 (2019) (contrasting the positivist view that judges make law with views
of the common law as derived from natural law, social norms, or custom); A.W.B. Simpson, The
Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 77, 80
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) (“[T]he common law is best understood as a system of customary law,
that is, as a body of traditional ideas received within a caste of experts.”).
53. See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 47, at 60–61.
54. See, e.g., J.R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY, 1603-1689, at 38–39 (1928).
55. See id. at 39–40.
56. See infra notes 207–209 and accompanying text (describing the growth of judicial
independence in the eighteenth century).
57. MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF OYER AND
TERMINER AND GOAL DELIVERY FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746 IN THE COUNTY
OF SURRY, AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES TO WHICH ARE ADDED DISCOURSES UPON A FEW BRANCHES
OF THE CROWN LAW 394 (Dublin, Sarah Cotter 1767) (1762).
58. Medieval judges had described themselves as the priests. See THOMAS J. MCSWEENEY,
PRIESTS OF THE LAW: ROMAN LAW AND THE MAKING OF THE COMMON LAW’S FIRST PROFESSIONALS
1 (2019). By the eighteenth century, the term usually applied to lawyers (often pejoratively). See
DAVID LEMMINGS, PROFESSORS OF THE LAW: BARRISTERS AND ENGLISH LEGAL CULTURE IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 95, 145 n.178 (2000).
59. J.H. BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 75 (2001) (explaining that common opinion “was good evidence as to the state of
legal doctrine”).
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collaborators in discovering and declaring the law.60 Sir Matthew Hale,
an eminent seventeenth-century jurist, wrote that the “great Weight
and Authority” of judicial decisions derived not only from judges’
“greater learning, knowledge, and experience in the laws,” but also from
their having “the best Helps to inform their Judgments.”61 Adversarial
presentation enhanced the accuracy and authority of judicial opinions.62
Advisory opinions typically lacked that help.
In response to these concerns, judges developed norms to guide
their advisory practice. These included group consultation (discussed in
Section A), obtaining advice from the bar (Section B), avoiding
prejudgment of issues that might arise in subsequent litigation (Section
C), and issuing opinions only when they were likely to be followed
(Section D). These norms were not universal; indeed, judges sometimes
disagreed about whether they existed at all. But they collectively
suggest that judges treated advice-giving as a kind of legal procedure—
which, like other kinds of procedures, could be done improperly.
A. Group Consultation
Early modern judges typically issued seriatim opinions, rather
than a single opinion for the court.63 In their advisory work, however,
judges typically issued joint opinions—primarily, it seems, to
insulate themselves from royal pressure. And even when judges did
issue separate opinions, they sought to do so only after consulting
their colleagues.
This norm began to emerge as early as Peacham’s Case (1615),
which arose when the Privy Council wanted to prosecute a rector for
writing a sermon that imagined the King’s death, which the King’s
ministers deemed treason. The problem was that the rector had never
60. See Emily Kadens, The Puzzle of Judicial Education: The Case of Chief Justice William
De Grey, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 143, 150–51 (2009); see also Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and
Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 37–38 (1959) (noting that
colonial American judges cited the authority of “eminent members of the bar”); Peter M. Tiersma,
The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1231 (2007) (noting that the
barristers who argued a particular case “were normally experts in their field and may well have
known more about a specialized subject than the judges”). Even in the 1760s, Blackstone
discounted the authority of a reported case because it appeared from the report “that very many
Gentlemen of the Law were dissatisfied” with the decision. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *238–39.
61. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45 (Charles M. Gray
ed., 1971) (1739).
62. See NEIL DUXBURY, JURISTS AND JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE 76 (2001); cf. Matthew
Steilen, On the Place of Judge-Made Law in a Government of Laws, 3 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 243,
257–58 (2016) (describing this concern in the work of Chancellor James Kent).
63. See 1 JOHN BAKER, The Changing Concept of a Court, in COLLECTED PAPERS ON ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 413, 430–31 (2013).
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preached or published his “treasonable sermon,” which made his
prosecution doubtful.64 As was usual in such cases, the Attorney
General—the reliable royal servant Francis Bacon—consulted the
judges. But instead of asking their opinion collectively, as had been
customary, he tried to consult them separately. Sir Edward Coke, the
chief justice of King’s Bench, understood the purpose of Bacon’s
approach. Bacon was worried that Coke might convince his colleagues
that a secret writing could not constitute treason.65 By buttonholing the
judges individually, Bacon hoped to build a majority in favor of
prosecution before Coke could intervene. The chief justice complained
to Bacon that “such particular and . . . auricular taking of opinions was
not according to the custom of this realm.”66 Although Coke eventually
acquiesced—and delivered an opinion hostile to the Crown67—his
reluctance contributed to an understanding that seriatim advisory
opinions were disfavored. The Stuarts continued to seek separate
opinions, sometimes successfully.68 But by the eighteenth century,
Coke’s view had prevailed, and the judges’ advice typically took the form
of a jointly signed written opinion.69 Judges retained the freedom
to issue separate opinions, but these were issued only after
group consultation.70
B. Advising the Advisors
As explained above, judges saw the arguments of counsel as
crucial for helping them to declare the law, and a lack of argument was
reason to discount the authority of a judicial decision.71 This remains
64.
65.
66.

TANNER, supra note 54, at 38–39.
Id. at 39.
Letter from Francis Bacon to James I (Jan. 27, 1614), in 5 THE LETTERS AND THE LIFE OF
FRANCIS BACON 100, 100 (James Spedding ed., London, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer 1869).
67. TANNER, supra note 54, at 38–39.
68. See JAY, supra note 38, at 18 (describing Charles I’s successful efforts to obtain separate
advisory opinions from judges).
69. See, e.g., OPINION OF THE JUDGES ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE CONVOCATION IN MATTER
OF HERESY; GIVEN IN THE YEAR 1711, at 16 (London, John Henry Parker 1850) (reprinting an
opinion signed by multiple judges); The Opinion of the Judges of England About Money Bills in
Ireland and Poynings Law in Particular 216–17 (1694), SP 63/356 (on file with The National
Archives, UK) (same); Opinion of the Judges on Questions Concerning the Next Session of
Parliament (July 12, 1707), PC 1/2/72 (on file with The National Archives, UK) (same).
70. See, e.g., Opinion of the Judges About Visiting Foreign Ships in Our Ports (Mar. 1, 1699),
in 10 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF WILLIAM III, at 77, 77–78
(Edward Bateson ed., 1937) (reporting the solitary dissent of an admiralty judge); The Grand
Opinion for the Prerogative Concerning the Royal Family (1717) 92 Eng. Rep. 909; Fort. 401
(issuing seriatim opinions after conferring as a group).
71. See BAKER, supra note 63, at 430; Ian Williams, Early-Modern Judges and the Practice of
Precedent, in JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 51, 63–
64 (Paul Brand & Joshua Getzler eds., 2011) (“Coke regarded ‘precedents’ in the sense of
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one of the chief objections to advisory opinions today,72 and the problem
was apparent in the seventeenth century. In 1642, member of
Parliament John Pym condemned “extrajudicial Declarations of Judges
without hearing of counsel or argument” as “a teeming grievance” that
produced “many others.”73
Judges mitigated this problem in three ways. First, they
expressly discounted the authority of extrajudicial pronouncements. In
1662, for example, Chief Justice Bridgman distinguished “between
cases adjudged upon debate and having counsel on both sides, and
resolution upon a case reported or referred to” the judges without
argument.74 Second, the judges sometimes heard counsel before giving
their opinion. In at least one case, they heard counsel for one of the
parties;75 more often, they took the advice of the Crown’s law officers.76
Third, the judges sometimes issued their opinion together with
prominent members of the bar. In 1702, for example, the judges’ opinion
about the scope of martial law was joined by “[t]he Queen’s Serjeants,
Attorney and Solicitor General and all the civilians at Doctors’
Commons.”77 Although joint opinions lacked the benefit of adversarial
arguments from the record based on writs issued as more powerful where the judges have debated
them. The notion of debate leading to authority can also be seen with regard to reports of cases.”);
see also Rex v. Corp. of Wigan (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 560, 561; 2 Burr. 782, 784 (KB) (Mansfield, C.J.)
(discounting two precedents that “passed without argument or opposition,” while favoring “the two
subsequent precedents cited on the other side . . . [that] were debated and fully considered”).
72. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1360 (2015) (explaining that
the adverse-party requirement is thought to aid judicial decisionmaking).
73. Speeches Relating to Grievances (Nov. 7, 1640), in 2 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF
ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 642 (William Cobbett ed., London,
T.C. Hansard 1807) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY] (emphasis added).
74. Beckman v. Maplesden (1662) 124 Eng. Rep. 468, 478; Bridg. O. 60, 78 (CP).
75. In 1717, the judges were asked to resolve a family squabble between George I and his son,
the Prince of Wales (and future George II). The Grand Opinion for the Prerogative Concerning the
Royal Family (1717) 92 Eng. Rep. 909, 910; Fort. 401, 402. The King claimed a right as sovereign
to direct the care and education of the Prince’s children. Id. But the Prince claimed that his right
as a father trumped his father’s right as king. Id. at 911. After the Lord Chancellor referred the
issue to the twelve judges, the Prince requested “that he might be heard by his counsel” before the
judges made their decision. Id. at 910. The Prince’s request highlighted the conflict between judges’
duties as servants and as oracles. Although they wanted the assistance of counsel, they
unanimously agreed “that in cases wherein our advice is required by His Majesty, we cannot hear
counsel without His Majesty’s leave.” Id. The judges then sought the permission of the King, who
permitted the judges to hear argument. Id. at 911.
76. JAY, supra note 38, at 20.
77. Documents Relating to the Disorders at Port St. Mary’s: Opinion of the Judges (Nov. 4,
1702), in 1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF ANNE, PRESERVED IN
THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 285, 286 (Robert Pentland Mahaffy ed., 1916). Later judges expressed
doubts about the propriety of including the law officers as cosignatories, preferring to hear them
as counsel. James Oldham, The Work of Ryder and Murray as Law Officers of the Crown, in LEGAL
RECORD AND HISTORICAL REALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY
CONFERENCE CARDIFF 1987, at 157, 161–64 (Thomas G. Watkin ed., 1989).
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presentation, they could more plausibly claim to represent the common
understanding of the profession.
C. Avoiding Prejudgment
Judges also tried to ensure that their advisory activities
wouldn’t interfere with their freedom to declare the law in other
contexts. In some cases, this meant avoiding advisory opinions on issues
that might later arise in litigation; at other times, the judges reserved
the right to change their minds.78 Thus, in Whiston’s Case (1711), the
judges concluded by declaring their “entire freedom of altering our
opinions in case any records or proceedings which we are now strangers
to shall be laid before us, or any new considerations which have not
occurred to us to be suggested by the parties or their counsel to convince
us of our mistake.”79
D. Avoiding Unnecessary Opinions
These procedural norms mitigated, but did not eliminate, the
dangers of extrajudicial advice. Advisory opinions remained risky, and
judges accordingly sought to limit their frequency. That meant
withholding opinions that were unlikely to be followed, as a dispute
from 1747 reveals. George II had created a commission, composed of the
Privy Council and the twelve judges of the common-law courts, to hear
appeals in prize cases. Some doubts arose about the legality of the
commission, and Lord Chancellor Hardwicke instructed Attorney
General Sir Dudley Ryder and Solicitor General William Murray (later
Lord Mansfield) to brief the judges.80 Many of the judges refused even
to meet with Ryder and Murray. The judges’ objection was not to giving
advice or to hearing the presentations of counsel but to the timing of
the Crown’s request. Although “it might have been proper for them to
have met prior to the passing of the Commission in order to consider
the legality of it,” the judges worried about doing so after the King had

78. See, e.g., JOHN FORTESCUE, REPORTS OF SELECT CASES IN ALL THE COURTS OF
WESTMINSTER-HALL 389 (London, Henry Lintot 1748) (“The Judges ought not to deliver their
Opinions before Hand in any Criminal Case that may come before them judicially . . . .”). Fortescue
noted that this rule was frequently violated. Id. at 390.
79. OPINION OF THE JUDGES ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE CONVOCATION IN MATTER OF
HERESY; GIVEN IN THE YEAR 1711, supra note 69, at 16. To some extent, this reflected judges’ more
general willingness to change their minds when confronted with new evidence of the law, even in
the context of adjudication. See Williams, supra note 71, at 53–54. But even after judges became
more reluctant to abandon judicial precedents, they continued to insist on the provisional
character of their extrajudicial declarations.
80. Oldham, supra note 77, at 162.
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already “done what he thought fit.”81 Eventually, they agreed to hear
the law officers and to consider the matter.82 But although the judges
exchanged opinions with each other,83 they never produced a written
report for the King. (They also agreed that they “would give no opinion
in [the] presence” of the Attorney and Solicitor General.84) Instead, they
merely reported to Hardwicke that they were divided.85 But that
collective declaration of ambivalence was enough. In 1749, the cabinet
drafted, and Parliament enacted, a statute that obviated any doubts
about the prize commission’s lawfulness.86 The judges had fulfilled their
advisory function without giving any advice at all.
*

*

*

In 1775, the barrister and antiquarian Francis Hargrave used a
footnote in his new edition of Coke Upon Littleton to criticize advisory
opinions. “[I]t must be admitted,” Hargrave conceded, that such
opinions had a long history.87 “But however numerous and strong the
precedents may be,” he continued, “it is a right to be understood with
many exceptions, and such as ought to be exercised with great
reserve.”88 Most importantly, judges ought “rigid[ly]” to avoid giving
“opinions on causes actually depending.”89 He alluded to other norms
that limited the Crown’s right to advice, but he declined “to be more
particular on a subject of so much delicacy, by attempting to mark the
bounds to a right, the extent of which we do not find clearly ascertained
by precedent or authority.”90
This Part has tried to make those norms more explicit. Like
Hargrave, eighteenth-century judges did not always explain their

81. Hargrave Ms. 431, at 6 (Nov. 30, 1748) (on file with the British Library).
82. Notes of Sir William Lee (Dec. 1748), OSB MSS 52/11/1–8 (on file with the Beinecke Rare
Book & Manuscript Library, Yale University).
83. Hargrave Ms. 431, supra note 81, at 18 (reporting that the judges came to Chief Justice
Lee’s chambers on December 6 and 9, 1748, and “delivered their opinions on the Commission”).
Justice Burnet “sent his opinion by writing.” Id.
84. Hargrave Ms. 431, supra note 81, at 6.
85. Oldham, supra note 77, at 163–64.
86. Prize Causes Act 1748, 22 Geo. 2 c. 3. The cabinet was a small group of high-ranking
ministers and royal advisers. See Ian R. Christie, The Cabinet During the Grenville
Administration, 1763-1765, 73 ENG. HIST. REV. 86–87 (1958); Philip Lawson, Further Reflections
on the Cabinet in the Early Years of George III’s Reign, 57 HIST. RSCH. 237, 237–38 (1984).
87. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 168, n.5 (Francis Hargrave ed., London, G. Kearsly & G.
Robinson 1775).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.

638

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3:621

advisory practice, perhaps because its vagueness was a useful tool for
dodging the Crown’s demands.91 The numbers bear this out: although
we lack an official register of advisory opinions, no monarch after 1660
seems to have obtained more than a handful.92 They remained an
accepted but carefully circumscribed part of the duty of English judges.
III. THE DEMISE OF ADVISORY OPINIONS
The classical common law provided a framework that
accommodated advisory opinions while seeking to mitigate their risks.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, that framework
broke down, and judges throughout the common-law world tried harder
to escape their roles as advisors.
This Part describes this development through three case studies.
Section A offers a new view of Sackville’s Case, the last written advisory
opinion given to the British Crown.93 The judges in that case granted
the request for advice, but their evident reluctance to do so contributed
to a new norm against the Crown soliciting formal legal advice at all.
Section B takes the story to British-controlled Bengal, where judges on
the Supreme Court of Judicature similarly sought to limit their
advisory role, in ways that went beyond what the classical model
required. Section C retells the more familiar story of the Jay Court’s
refusal in 1793.
A. England
Sackville’s Case began with a disgraced cavalry officer’s attempt
to salvage his reputation. At the Battle of Minden in 1759, Lord George
Sackville received ambiguous orders to pursue retreating French
troops. Sackville failed to advance, and his superior, Prince Ferdinand
of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, blamed him for allowing France to escape
a decisive defeat.94 Sackville resigned his commission and returned to

91. For the idea that early modern judges saw vagueness as a bulwark against tyranny, see
Christian R. Burset, Redefining the Rule of Law: An Eighteenth-Century Case Study, AM. J.
COMPAR. L. (forthcoming 2022).
92. See Book Review: The Judges of England, with Sketches of Their Lives, and Miscellaneous
Notices Connected with the Courts at Westminster, from the Time of the Conquest, by Edward Foss,
L. MAG. & L. REV. OR Q.J. JURIS., Nov. 1858-Feb. 1859, at 31, 39 (counting advisory opinions). That
list is imperfect—for example, it seems to count an opinion given to George II as given to George
III—but it indicates a general downward trend after the Restoration. Id.
93. But cf. infra Appendix (discussing a possible exception).
94. ANDREW JACKSON O’SHAUGHNESSY, THE MEN WHO LOST AMERICA: BRITISH LEADERSHIP,
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND THE FATE OF THE EMPIRE 168–69 (2013).
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London, where the press condemned his alleged cowardice.95 Sackville
maintained that he had acted properly, and he decided that the only
way to restore his good name was to have a court-martial judge
his actions.96
As soon as the court-martial commenced, however, its members
expressed doubts about two important issues. First, Sackville was no
longer in the army; could he still be tried under military law? Second,
was the court-martial authorized to impose a capital sentence?97 The
court-martial’s members were army officers without legal training, and
they asked the King “to direct the Judges of the Land to give their
opinion.”98 George II agreed to do so.99
The judges eventually issued an opinion, but only on the first
question, and only after initially refusing to say anything at all. Why?
The prevailing explanation is that Lord Mansfield, arguably the most
influential judge in England at the time, took the lead in resisting the
King’s request.100 This Mansfield-centered story has an important
implication: it suggests that the demise of advisory opinions in England
was largely the product of his own idiosyncratic priorities.101 This
interpretation is plausible—George II himself blamed Mansfield for the
judges’ obstinacy102—but a careful review of the evidence suggests
something different. As it turns out, the judges were all reluctant to
decide Sackville’s Case; and to the extent that Mansfield’s views stood
out, it was because he was more willing to accommodate the Crown, not
less.103 As a result, we need to explain the decline of advisory opinions
by looking beyond Mansfield’s personal preferences.
95. PIERS MACKESY, THE COWARD OF MINDEN: THE AFFAIR OF LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE 158–
61 (1979).
96. Id. at 161–64. This was a risky maneuver. Two years earlier, Britain had executed
Admiral John Byng after a court-martial found that he had failed “to do his utmost” to engage the
French navy. N.A.M. RODGER, THE COMMAND OF THE OCEAN: A NAVAL HISTORY OF BRITAIN 16491815, at 267 (2004). The government also had much to lose. An acquittal would antagonize
Britain’s popular ally Prince Ferdinand, see FRED ANDERSON, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN
YEARS’ WAR AND THE FATE OF EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766, at 300 (2001), while
a conviction would rekindle the political controversy over Byng’s execution, see SARAH KINKEL,
DISCIPLINING THE EMPIRE: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND THE RISE OF THE BRITISH NAVY 130–
38 (2018).
97. At a General Court Martial 2 (Feb. 29, 1760) WO 71/134 (on file with The National
Archives, UK).
98. Id.
99. See Certificate of the Judges Respecting the Court-Martial Proposed to Be Held upon
Lord George Sackville (1760) 28 Eng. Rep. 940, 940; 2 Eden 371, 371.
100. JAY, supra note 38, at 44–45; Pushaw, supra note 30, at 475–76.
101. See JAY, supra note 38, at 44–45 (describing Mansfield’s desire to avoid political damage
that could result from issuing an advisory opinion in Sackville’s Case).
102. See MACKESY, supra note 95, at 181–82 (describing the King’s anger with Mansfield).
103. See id. There are other signs that Mansfield was comparatively unconcerned about
advisory activity. In Perrin v. Blake, Mansfield was part of the Privy Council committee that heard
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First, though, it’s important to set out what happened.104 The
court-martial asked for guidance on February 29, 1760. The cabinet met
that night to consider the issue, as the Duke of Newcastle later reported
to William Pitt.105 (Newcastle and Pitt were effectively co-prime
ministers. Newcastle had been present at the cabinet meeting, but Pitt
had been too ill to attend.) The cabinet agreed nearly unanimously that
the first question, concerning the court-martial’s jurisdiction, should be
referred to the judges.106 Newcastle made a point of noting that the
lawyers present had shared this consensus. Lord Hardwicke, the
respected former Lord Chancellor, had “thought the reference
extremely proper in a case of this nature, relating to the jurisdiction of
an inferior court.”107 Mansfield also “concurred,” although he asked
an appeal from Jamaica about the construction of wills. JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE
PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 325 (1950). The question presented was both
important and difficult, and Mansfield thought the Privy Council wasn’t up to answering it. See
id. Although the Privy Council was the court of last resort for colonial appeals, it consisted mostly
of nonlawyers, and it had a poor reputation for legal analysis. P.A. HOWELL, THE JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 1833-1876: ITS ORIGINS, STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 8–9
(1979). Accordingly, Mansfield proposed to refer the case to King’s Bench (of which he was chief
justice), so that the Privy Council would render judgment based on that court’s advice. See SMITH,
supra, at 325 & n.338. This would not have been an advisory opinion strictly speaking, because
the reference would have come from the King “in his judicial capacity.” Hodgson v. Ambrose (1780)
99 Eng. Rep. 216, 220 n.3; 1 Dougl. 337, 344 n.3. Nonetheless, Mansfield’s fellow judges refused to
accept the reference, and they insisted on Perrin being brought in King’s Bench as a feigned action.
SMITH, supra, at 326. Another example came a few years later, during a debate in the House of
Lords about a controversial colonial statute. Mansfield, eager for political reasons to have the
statute declared void, “demanded that the opinions of the judges might be taken.” Letter from
Horace Walpole to Horace Mann (May 24, 1767), in 22 THE YALE EDITION OF HORACE WALPOLE’S
CORRESPONDENCE 519, 520 (W.S. Lewis ed., 1960). The Lords rejected Mansfield’s demand, and
one observer thought the other “judges would not have given their opinions if asked.” Id.; see also
SMITH, supra, at 631–35 (discussing this incident).
104. The story has been well told by JAY, supra note 38, at 31–34, but this Article departs from
his account in one crucial way. Although Professor Jay consulted a broad combination of primary
and secondary sources, the structure of his narrative relied on work by Dr. Piers Mackesy, a
respected military historian. Id. at 214 n.81. Dr. Mackesy’s account indicated that Mansfield
refused to issue an opinion until he attended a cabinet meeting at which the Duke of Newcastle
convinced him to change his mind. MACKESY, supra note 95, at 181–82. Professor Jay quite
reasonably adopted this sequence of events. But the relevant letters indicate that the cabinet
meeting happened first. In other words, Mansfield was initially willing to give an opinion, but his
meeting with the other judges discouraged him from doing so. See infra notes 105–120 and
accompanying text.
105. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to William Pitt (Mar. 1, 1760), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE
OF WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM 23, 23–24 (William Stanhope Taylor & John Henry Pringle
eds., London, John Murray 1838).
106. There was a heated dissent from Lord Granville, who insisted “with great vehemence”
that Sackville “was not triable by a court-martial; that the Judges had nothing to do with it; and
that it was wronger still to refer it to them.” Id. It is not clear why he objected or why he thought
the issue so obvious. A few weeks earlier, the Attorney and Solicitor General had given their
opinion that Sackville was indeed triable by a court-martial. Letter from Charles Pratt & Charles
Yorke to Lord Holdernesse (Jan. 12, 1760), State Papers 41/23, at 311r, 312r (on file with The
National Archives, UK).
107. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to William Pitt (Mar. 1, 1760), supra note 105, at 24.
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that, “being a judge,” his name be omitted from the record.108 On the
second question, concerning Sackville’s possible punishment, “it was
unanimously agreed, that it would be highly improper to refer that to
the Judges.”109 The reason, Newcastle explained, was that the question
“was indeed desiring to know of them what the court was to do, which
depended upon themselves.”110 In other words, Sackville, if convicted,
might appeal to those same judges, and it would have been improper to
demand a preview of their answer. Pitt replied to Newcastle that this
was “perfectly right.”111
So far, so good. But there was a logistical hurdle. The courtmartial needed “a speedy answer.”112 Britain was still at war, and many
of the court’s members and witnesses were active-duty officers.113 But
the judges were about to ride their semiannual circuit around England,
and at least one judge had already departed. Somebody (perhaps
Mansfield) indicated that those who remained might not answer the
question presented until they had all returned to London.114 The judges’
attitude might simply have reflected the long-standing norm of group
consultation.115 But whatever the cause, the delay exposed Mansfield to
acute political danger.116 A rumor was spreading that Mansfield had
encouraged the judges to stall: Mansfield and Sackville, it was said,
were friends, and Mansfield wasn’t eager to see Sackville put on trial
for his life.117 Newcastle urged Mansfield, his friend and former protégé,
to get the judges to cooperate as quickly as possible—or to find someone
else to blame for their delay. “I know there are those in the highest
stations of the Law who say it may be done,” Newcastle wrote; “at least
let it appear that if it is not done it is not your fault . . . . For God’s sake
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 24–25.
111. Letter from William Pitt to the Duke of Newcastle (Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903, at 17
(on file with the British Library).
112. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to William Pitt, supra note 105, at 25.
113. Sackville himself had declined to call certain witnesses out of fear that doing so would
compromise military operations. 1 HIST. MANUSCRIPTS COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF
MRS. STOPFORD-SACKVILLE, OF DRAYTON HOUSE, NORTHAMPTONSHIRE 318 (1904).
114. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to William Pitt (Mar. 1, 1760), supra note 105, at 25
& n.1.
115. Supra Section II.A.
116. See Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to [Andrew] Stone (Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903,
at 10, 10 (on file with the British Library); Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Mansfield
(Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903, at 6 (on file with the British Library).
117. See, e.g., Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to [Andrew] Stone, supra note 116, at 11
(“The King is extremely hurt with Lord Mansfield. . . . He takes it to be Friendship to Lord
George.”); see also 3 HORACE WALPOLE, MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE SECOND 252–
55 (Lord Holland ed., 2d ed. rev., London, Henry Colburn 1846) (describing Mansfield’s supposed
friendship with Sackville).
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consider whether it may not be proper for the remaining Judges to give
an answer.”118 Mansfield, however, insisted that he couldn’t help. He
had already explained to Newcastle he had no objection to advising the
King on this issue, even publicly.119 But Newcastle would “have no
opinion from the Judges”120—not because Mansfield himself was
unwilling, but because his colleagues could “not be induced to give a
separate Opinion.”121
Two days later, the judges changed their minds, for unclear
reasons. The eleven who remained in London issued a short, jointly
signed statement that they saw “no ground to doubt of the legality of
the jurisdiction of a Court-Martial in the case put by the above
question.”122 Their opinion included a conventional caveat:
But as the matter may several ways be brought, in due course of law, judicially before
some of us . . . we shall be ready, without difficulty, to change our opinion, if we see cause,
upon objections that may be then laid before us, though none have occurred to us at
present which we think sufficient.123

So far, the judges’ actions reflected the classical norms described
in Part II, particularly the emphasis on group consultation. But when
Mansfield transmitted the opinion to the Crown, his cover letter added
a new wrinkle. The judges, he reported,
are exceedingly thankful to his Majesty for his tenderness in not sending any question to
them till the necessity of such reference became manifest and urgent. . . . In general, they
are very averse to giving extra-judicial opinions, especially where they affect a particular
case; but the circumstances of the trial now depending ease us of difficulties upon this
occasion, and we have laid in our claim not to be bound by this answer.124

Mansfield’s letter indicated a deeper opposition to advisory opinions
than the classical common law would have suggested.
Sackville’s Case only became a landmark in retrospect. At least
into the 1780s, observers continued to assume that advisory opinions
were permissible.125 Nonetheless, it appears to have been the last
118. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Mansfield, supra note 116.
119. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to [Andrew] Stone, supra note 116, at 11.
120. Letter from Lord Mansfield to the Duke of Newcastle (Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903, at
8 (on file with the British Library).
121. Letter from Lord Barrington to the Duke of Newcastle (Mar. 1, 1760), Add. Ms. 32903, at
12 (on file with the British Library).
122. Certificate of the Judges Respecting the Court-Martial Proposed To Be Held upon Lord
George Sackville (1760) 28 Eng. Rep. 940, 940–41; 2 Eden. 371, 371.
123. Id.
124. Letter of Lord Mansfield to the Lord Keeper, Enclosing the Above Certificate (1760) 28
Eng. Rep. 941, 941; 2 Eden 373, 373 (emphasis added).
125. In 1772, Benjamin Franklin presented the colonial secretary, Lord Dartmouth, with a
controversial petition from Massachusetts. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Cushing
(Dec. 2, 1772), in 19 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 399, 409 (William B. Willcox ed., 1959).
Dartmouth counseled against forwarding it to George III. Id. at 409. The King, Dartmouth warned,
might “require the Opinion of the Judges or Government Lawyers, which would surely be against”
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formal advisory opinion that English judges gave to the executive.126
Some observers might have missed it, but the Crown’s relations with
the judiciary had changed.127
B. Bengal
In 1765, the British East India Company became the de facto
ruler of Bengal. Under a grant from the Mughal Emperor, the Company
gained the right to collect taxes from, and the responsibility to
administer justice for, the region’s more than twenty million
inhabitants.128 Eight years later, in response to the perceived failures
of Company rule, Parliament passed the Regulating Act, which created
a new governance structure for British India. The statute placed
executive and legislative authority in the hands of a governor-general
and four-member council, who were accountable to the Company but
effectively appointed by government ministers. (The act itself named
the first four councilors.)129 It also authorized the Crown to charter
a new Supreme Court of Judicature, to be staffed by royally
appointed judges.130
From the beginning, the SCJ and the Council disagreed about
their relationship. In particular, three views emerged about the SCJ’s
duty to render advisory opinions. The first view belonged to GovernorGeneral Warren Hastings, who enthusiastically sought the judges’
advice. The Regulating Act had empowered the Council to legislate with
the “consent and approbation” of the SCJ.131 Hastings argued that the
judges should therefore participate in the legislative process, and he
proposed giving the chief justice “a fixed or occasional seat at the
the petition. Id. Neither Franklin nor Dartmouth was a lawyer, and Franklin’s account of the
meeting might not have been accurate. See id. n.4. Nonetheless, Franklin’s comment indicates that
advisory opinions were not obviously out of bounds. For an example from the 1780s, see infra
Appendix.
126. But cf. infra Appendix (discussing a possible exception).
127. By the way, Sackville landed on his feet. The court-martial declared him “unfit to serve
his Majesty in any military capacity whatever”—a verdict humiliating enough to appease George
II but too trifling to justify a capital sentence or even to permanently damage his political career.
O’SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 94, at 169. George II died six months later, which cleared the way for
Sackville’s rehabilitation. He resumed his work as a member of Parliament, and in 1775 he became
secretary of state for the American colonies, in which capacity he served as primary architect of
the failed war against their independence. See id. at 165–206.
128. P.J. MARSHALL, THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF EMPIRES: BRITAIN, INDIA, AND AMERICA
C.1750-1783, at 207 (2005).
129. Id. at 213.
130. Charter of Justice, Dated 26th March 1774, in THE RULES AND ORDERS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF JUDICATURE AT FORT WILLIAM IN BENGAL 135, 135 (Longueville Clarke ed., Calcutta,
Samuel Smith & Co. 1829).
131. Regulating Act 1773, 13 Geo. 3 c. 63, § 36.
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Council Board.”132 His attitude reflected his long-standing friendship
with Sir Elijah Impey, the first chief justice, whom he hoped to gain as
an ally in the Council’s political struggles.133
Hastings’s opponents on the council—John Clavering, George
Monson, and Philip Francis—developed a second view, which was more
circumspect about judicial advice.134 To some extent, they were
suspicious of Impey’s friendship with Hastings; but their attitude also
reflected their belief that the SCJ and the Council ought to be mutually
independent. For example, they argued that the SCJ was meant to
review the Council’s regulations “in the nature of an appeal, the Benefit
of which would be lost, if there were any previous Communication and
agreement between the Legislative and Judicial Powers.”135 As a
result, it would be improper not only for the judges to attend Council
meetings, but even for them to offer “an extrajudicial opinion” about
proposed legislation.136 If the Council needed advice, it ought to get its
own lawyer.137
Francis, the faction’s leader, was especially sensitive to
separation-of-powers concerns. When a dispute arose about Hastings’s
authority to dissolve the Council, some of his colleagues suggested that
the matter be settled by obtaining an opinion of counsel. Francis
rejected that idea. Although individual councilors could seek advice as
they saw fit, he “disapprove[d] of submitting the internal Rights and
powers of the Supreme Council” to the judgment of private attorneys.138
“I am of the same opinion with respect to the Judges,” he continued.139
The matter could “never come regularly before them” as a court; and it
would be improper for them to furnish “an extrajudicial opinion.”140
132. Letter from Warren Hastings to Lord North (Apr. 2, 1775), in 1 MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF
RIGHT HON. WARREN HASTINGS, FIRST GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL 534, 542 (G.R. Gleig
ed., London, Richard Bentley 1841) [hereinafter HASTINGS MEMOIRS].
133. See LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY,
1400-1900, at 136 n.14 (2002) (discussing Hastings’s friendship with Impey); ROBERT TRAVERS,
IDEOLOGY AND EMPIRE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY INDIA: THE BRITISH IN BENGAL 186–87 (2007)
(indicating that Hastings used the court to pursue political goals).
134. For the factions on the council, see TRAVERS, supra note 133, at 145–46.
135. Memorandum from John Clavering, George Monson & Phillip Francis (Apr. 12, 1774),
Add. Ms. 29207, at 52 (on file with the British Library).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Letter from Philip Francis to John Clavering (Mar. 19, 1775), Mss. Eur. E15, at 87 (on
file with the British Library). The issue was eventually submitted to several eminent attorneys in
England, who generally concluded that Hastings had the power to dissolve the Council. JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN: THE STORY OF
NUNCOMAR AND THE IMPEACHMENT OF SIR ELIJAH IMPEY 46 n.§ (Lisa Rodensky ed., 2013).
139. Letter from Philip Francis to John Clavering, supra note 138, at 87.
140. Id. at 87–88; see also id. (arguing that any opinion from the judges would not “carry any
other Authority, than that of eminent Lawyers, by which we might or might not be directed”).
THE
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Instead of seeking external advice, the councilors themselves should
trust their own ability “to understand the Law, under which [they]
act.”141 Excessive deferral to the judges, he warned, would elevate the
court into “the first power of the State.”142
The third and most restrictive view of advisory opinions came
from the judges themselves. Their position became clear following the
arrest of a senior Indian official named Nandakumar, who had been
accused of forgery.143 Nandakumar complained to the Council that the
conditions of his confinement were inconsistent with his religious
practices.144 The Council asked Impey to investigate. He did so and
reported back in a letter that assured the Council of his desire to
accommodate prisoners’ beliefs while also warning against “suffer[ing]
the pretence of Religion to be set up to elude the ordinary course of
Justice.”145 But Impey was less concerned about the merits of
Nandakumar’s petition than the Council’s willingness to receive it. In
the future, the chief justice insisted, prisoners should apply directly to
the court. Otherwise, the Council’s intervention in high-profile cases
might undermine the court’s appearance of impartiality.146
The Council—more precisely, the majority composed of Francis,
Clavering, and Monson147—construed Impey’s letter as an attack on
their authority.148 Impey then tried to backtrack. He professed “infinite
concern that any thing in my former letter could by any strained
construction be interpreted to question the authority of the Board.”149
He would never have suggested anything of the sort, he explained,
because “[t]he bounds between the Authority of the Supreme Court and

141. Id. at 88.
142. Id.
143. He was eventually executed for that crime. See, e.g., P.J. MARSHALL, THE IMPEACHMENT
OF WARREN HASTINGS 135–36 (1965). His trial occasioned immediate and enduring debate about
whether Hastings had rigged the proceedings to silence his political enemy and the extent to which
English criminal law should be administered in India. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra, at 141;
STEPHEN, supra note 138, at xv.
144. Nandakumar alleged that he was unable to perform religious ceremonies in prison or to
eat in any “room where Christians or Mussulmen had been.” Letter from Elijah Impey to the
Governor-Gen. & Council (May 9, 1775), Add. Ms. 16265, at 23r (on file with the British Library).
145. Id. at 24r.
146. Id. at 24v.
147. Although the letters in this series were signed from the “governor-general and council,”
at least some appear to have been sent over Hastings’s objection. See Letter from Warren Hastings
to Graham & Macleane (May 20, 1775), Add. Ms. 29127, at 202v, 203r (on file with the British
Library) (“The majority have commenced a war with the Chief Justice & the Judges, & in a Spirit
peculiar to themselves.”).
148. See Letter from John Clavering, George Monson & Phillip Francis to Lord Rochford (May
16, 1775), Mss. Eur. E13, at 389 (on file with the British Library).
149. Letter from Elijah Impey to the Governor-Gen. & Council (May 15, 1775), Add. Ms. 16265,
at 26r (on file with the British Library).

646

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3:621

the Council are of too delicate a nature to be discussed” unless
absolutely necessary.150 But that annoyed the Council even more. “We
do not agree” that the boundary between the court’s and the Council’s
authority is “too delicate” to be discussed, they replied; “we think that
the lawful powers of every branch of government should be fixed and
declared, and particularly that the limits of the Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court should be ascertained.”151 In other words, the Council
wanted Impey to spell out the SCJ’s jurisdiction.
This time, the Council drew a response from the full court. The
letter reiterated the chief justice’s warning that it was dangerous to
chat about “delicate” jurisdictional matters and insisted that the judges
“have no authority to make, extrajudicially, a more particular
declaration, or description of the powers of the Court.”152 The judges, in
other words, said they could not render an advisory opinion about their
own jurisdiction.
This created a problem. Bengal had a tangle of competing
courts—some controlled by the Company, others by the Crown—and it
was important to specify the lines of authority.153 The Council,
concerned about the consequences of unresolvable jurisdictional
conflicts, took the extraordinary step of suspending an important civil
court, the sadr diwani adalat, pending the SCJ’s opinion.154 Impey had
no interest in being blamed for the court’s closure, and he complained
that the Council was acting as if the judges had said “it was improper
that it should be defined and known over whom the Court hath or hath
not Jurisdiction.”155 But they had only refused to address two subjects:
the Council’s power to review judges’ decisions (such as their
imprisonment of Nandakumar) and the Council’s “Right to
communicate Petitions to the Judges.”156
Now, with Bengal’s judiciary descending into chaos, the judges
felt compelled to explain themselves. With respect to the first point,
150. Id.
151. Letter from the Governor-Gen. & Council to Elijah Impey (May 16, 1775), Add. Ms. 16265,
at 27r–27v (on file with the British Library).
152. Letter from the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. & Council (May 20, 1775), in
2 SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, DESPATCHES, AND OTHER STATE PAPERS PRESERVED IN THE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1772-1785, at 378, 378 (George W. Forrest
ed., Calcutta, Superintendent of Gov’t Printing 1890).
153. See HALLIDAY, supra note 10, at 281–89.
154. Letter from the Governor-Gen. & Council to Sup. Ct. of Judicature (May 23, 1775), in 5
REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: EAST INDIES—1781, 1782, at 441, 441
(London, reprinted by Ord. of the House 1804) [hereinafter REPORTS]; Extract of Bengal Revenue
Consultations (May 23, 1775), in REPORTS, supra, at 440.
155. Letter from Elijah Impey to the Governor-Gen. & Council (May 25, 1775), Add. Ms. 16265,
at 29v (on file with the British Library).
156. Id. at 30r.
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Impey considered it his “Duty on the part of the Judges to assert, ‘That
there doth not reside in the Governor General and Council any legal
authority what so ever to review and control any Judicial acts of the
Judges done either in or out of Court, be those acts ever so
erroneous.’ ”157 This short statement, issued jointly on behalf of all the
judges, reads like a classic advisory opinion. But then, turning to the
second question, Impey seemed to say that advisory opinions were
impermissible: “[N]o Board even of the highest authority in England
can refer any matter either to a Court of Justice or any Judge thereof,
otherwise than by suit legally instituted.”158 Taken together, these two
statements indicated that the judges might occasionally be willing to
give advice, but that the Council had no right to seek it.
This was not because the judges wanted to keep their powers
vague. As Impey emphasized, they had promulgated rules of procedure
meant to clarify their jurisdiction, and his first charge to the grand jury
had covered the same topic. “[T]o give sanction to it,” Impey continued,
“I asked [the other judges] publickly [sic] whether they concurred with
me, & had the satisfaction of their full concurrence.”159 Moreover, Impey
had been willing to “converse” with councilors privately—and even “to
give answers in writing”—“but always with this reserve that my
Judgment should not be considered bound by any extrajudicial
opinion.”160 The only thing that Impey shouldn’t do, he concluded,
was “authoritatively ascertain” questions of law outside of
ordinary litigation.161
This response failed to satisfy the Council, and the sadr diwani
adalat remained closed. A few days later, the justices relented and
rendered the opinion that the Council had demanded.162 In doing so,
they took the same approach as the English justices in 1760: issuing an
advisory opinion while warning against asking for more. Their short
letter clarified the SCJ’s jurisdiction, and particularly its relationship
to Company-run courts. The letter also offered several qualifications.
Like the judges in Sackville’s Case, Impey and his colleagues thanked
the Council for its “Caution . . . in submitting Questions to us.”163 (One

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 30r–30v.
160. Id. at 30v.
161. Id.
162. Letter from Elijah Impey, Stephen Caesar LeMaistre & John Hyde to the Governor-Gen.
& Council (May 28, 1775), in REPORTS, supra note 154, at 441. Justice Chambers was out of town,
but his colleagues asserted that he would have agreed with their opinion. Id.
163. Id.
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detects a hint of sarcasm.) Advisory opinions were to be rarely sought
and rarely given.
The letter then explained why the present situation merited
an exception:
Though we are not in general justifiable [i.e., subject to your jurisdiction], and therefore
ought to be reserved in delivering extra-judicial Opinions; we are at all times desirous of
affording you every Assistance and Information that is compatible with our Duty. As the
Questions now proposed will, as we apprehend, never come judicially before us, and as we
shall thereby prevent the Suspension of Justice, we are much pleased to feel ourselves at
liberty to give you direct and full Answers.164

This passage made several arguments. First, the justices reminded the
Council of their independence (“not in general justifiable”). Unlike
English judges, the SCJ’s justices had no duty to advise. Second,
maintaining that independence required that advice be given sparingly
(“we . . . therefore ought to be reserved in delivering extrajudicial
opinions”). Indeed, the justices hinted that only an exceptional
circumstance—in this case, the “suspension” of Company-controlled
courts—justified their cooperation. Third, extrajudicial opinions were
only appropriate on matters that would never arise “judicially,” that is,
in the course of litigation. (They did not say whether this was because
this eliminated the risk of prejudging a future case or because there
would otherwise be no way for the judges to address the issue.) Only
when these conditions were satisfied, the justices concluded, would they
be “at liberty” to answer extrajudicial inquiries; and even then, they
need not do so.165
The Council got the letter but not the message. It continued to
demand advisory opinions, which the judges repeatedly refused to give.
In July 1775, they expressed their “deepest concern” that “the Council
still persist[ed], notwithstanding the frequent declarations and
unanimous opinion of the Court,” to demand advice.166 One especially
obnoxious request asked the judges to decide whether the Crown or the
Company was the sovereign of Bengal—one of the most contentious
questions in British law and politics.167 Impey, on behalf of the judges,
replied that the SCJ would decide the question “if it became absolutely
necessary”—such as during litigation—but the justices “would avoid it

164. Id. For justifiable, see the second definition of that word in OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(3d ed. 2013), https://oed.com/view/Entry/102219 [https://perma.cc/7GNE-YAE6].
165. Letter from Elijah Impey, Stephen Caesar LeMaistre & John Hyde to the Governor-Gen.
& Council (May 28, 1775), supra note 162, at 441.
166. Opinion of the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature (July 6, 1775), in 20 A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 1771–1777, at 1135, 1136 (T.B. Howell ed., 1814) (Impey, C.J.).
167. See, e.g., Spencer A. Leonard, ‘The Capital Object of the Public’: The 1766–7
Parliamentary Inquiry into the East India Company, 132 ENG. HIST. REV. 1110, 1143 (2017).
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if [they] could.”168 In any event, he continued, “we would not give [an
opinion] until we had heard every thing that could be said on either
side, nor until we had obtained all the lights and information that could
be obtained on the subject.”169 Although Impey professed his willingness
to provide “every right and every assistance, judicially or extrajudicially, which I think I legally may,” he reiterated his opposition to
advisory opinions.170
Impey and Hyde found themselves compelled to make a similar
argument a few months later. “We . . . must decline to make a
Precedent of submitting to answer Questions . . . which you have
neither grounds nor right to put to us,” they scolded the Council.171 As
in England, the justices were willing to offer advice in their private
capacities.172 But they continued to resist the Council’s calls for official
legal advice.
The judges made some exceptions. In 1777, the government fell
into disarray when its members disagreed about who was actually
governor-general. Clavering and Francis claimed that Hastings had
resigned and that Clavering had succeeded to his position. Awkwardly
for them, Hastings insisted that he remained in office.173 The two sides
agreed to submit their dispute to the judges, who returned a unanimous
opinion a few hours later, declaring that Hastings was governorgeneral.174 Even in the midst of that crisis, however, the judges sought
to limit their advisory role. Although the contending councilors had
appealed to the judges’ “judgment and authority” to settle the
dispute,175 the judges emphasized their wish “to deliver such an opinion
as from the reasoning of it, not from its authority, might” resolve the
matter.176 They added that only “the fatal consequences of a divided
Government” could have persuaded them “to deliver any opinion at

168. Opinion of the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature (July 6, 1775), supra note 166, at 1141.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1137.
171. Letter from Elijah Impey & John Hyde to the Governor-Gen. & Council (Sept. 9, 1775),
Add. Ms. 16265, at 55r (on file with the British Library).
172. See, e.g., Letter from Elijah Impey to Warren Hastings (Jan. 11, 1776), Add. Ms. 29137,
at 9 (on file with the British Library); Opinion of Sir R. Chambers on a Question Referred to Him,
([after 1774]), Taussig Collection, box 48, folder 355, at 139 (on file with the Beinecke Rare Book
& Manuscript Library, Yale University).
173. SOPHIA WEITZMAN, WARREN HASTINGS AND PHILIP FRANCIS 103–04 (1929).
174. Letter from the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to John Clavering & Philip Francis (June
20, 1777) [hereinafter SCJ Letter], in 12 BENGAL: PAST & PRESENT 11, 15 (W.K. Firminger
ed., 1916).
175. Address from John Clavering & Philip Francis to the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature
(June 20, 1777), in 12 BENGAL: PAST & PRESENT, supra note 174, at 8, 10.
176. SCJ Letter, supra note 174, at 15 (emphasis added).
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all.”177 This was meant, in other words, to be a rare exception—one in
which the judges spoke as counselors and arbitrators, not judges.
The tension over advisory opinions lasted even as personnel
changed. In 1788, a different set of judges—Chambers, Hyde, and Sir
William Jones—again had occasion to reject a request for advice.178
“Extrajudicial opinions are never given by English Judges but with
caution, and on such extraordinary emergencies as are out of the
common course of Law,” they explained.179 Although they acknowledged
that the members of the SCJ had “thought themselves obliged to give
such opinions more frequently than is expected from Judges in
England,” they had nonetheless done so only where the alternative
would have been to await instructions from England and “where danger
or great inconvenience to the Public must have ensued from such
delay.”180 Otherwise, such advice would be improper.
The members of the SCJ didn’t manage to eliminate advisory
opinions. Although they were formally independent of the governorgeneral and Council, they had a limited appetite for confrontation.
Nonetheless, their reluctance to advise went beyond what the classical
common law would have indicated. When the justices wrote in 1788 that
they gave opinions more frequently than their English counterparts,
they were measuring themselves against the standard that had
emerged after Sackville’s Case—one that had effectively eliminated
judges’ advisory duties in England.
C. United States
The Jay Court’s refusal to issue an advisory opinion in 1793 is
well known,181 and this Section will retell that story only briefly.
Colonial Americans had inherited the classical understanding of
extrajudicial advice.182 They recognized its dangers while also accepting

177. Id.
178. Impey had left India but had not officially resigned, so that Chambers was acting chief
justice. Bowyer, supra note 11. Justice Lemaistre had died in 1777. PANDEY, supra note 11, at 41.
Jones, the newest addition to the court, was a Welsh barrister and polymath with an international
reputation as an orientalist. Michael J. Franklin, Jones, Sir William, in DNB, supra note 11,
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/15105 [https://perma.cc/VU3Q-ZWJE].
179. Letter from the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. in Council (Sept.
11, 1788), in 2 THE LETTERS OF SIR WILLIAM JONES 809, 810 (Garland Cannon ed., 1970).
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., CASTO, supra note 36, at 113–21; JAY, supra note 38, at 134–38; Arlyck, supra
note 37, at 19–23.
182. See JAY, supra note 38, at 51–56 (discussing examples of colonial governments seeking
advisory opinions from judges).
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its legitimacy and utility.183 This traditional attitude persisted into the
Constitutional Convention, where some delegates assumed that federal
judges would continue the English tradition of advising the executive.184
By 1793, however, many politicians and lawyers had developed
a sense that advisory opinions might be objectionable. When legal
questions emerged during the Neutrality Crisis, President Washington
and his cabinet agreed that it would be proper to ask the Supreme Court
for advice. But they doubted whether the Justices would acquiesce. The
President initially asked only for a meeting, not a written opinion.185
Before transmitting the questions themselves, Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson first asked the Justices “Whether the public may,
with propriety, be availed of their advice?”186 There is no evidence that
Jefferson ever sent substantive questions to the Justices; the actual
correspondence seems to have focused solely on whether it would be
appropriate to do so.187

183. John Adams, for example, saw both sides. On one hand, he quoted Justice Foster’s
warning about the dangers of advisory opinions. John Adams, Letter to the Boston Gazette (Feb. 8,
1773), in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS: SEPTEMBER 1755 – OCTOBER 1773, at 287, 290 (Robert J.
Taylor ed., 1977) (quoting FOSTER, supra note 57). On the other hand, he urged colonists to seek
the “Extrajudicial Opinion” of Massachusetts judges during the Stamp Act crisis. John Adams,
Entry of Dec. 23, 1765, in 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS: 1755–1770, at 270, 271
(L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961); see also John Adams, Entry of Dec. 21, 1765, in 1 DIARY AND
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS: 1755–1770, supra, at 270 (outlining his proposed strategy).
Shortly afterwards, James Otis mocked those judges for being “so squeamish” about delivering
“extrajudicial opinions.” [James Otis], John Hampden to Wm. Pym, BOS. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J.,
Jan. 6, 1766, at 1. (For Otis’s authorship, see 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, supra,
at 287 n.2.) For more on Adams’s strategy, see EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE
STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION 146–49 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the colonists’
reaction to the closing of the courts during the Stamp Act crisis); JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF
CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 206 (Samuel M. Quincy ed., Boston, Little,
Brown, & Co. 1865) (discussing reactions to Adams’s argument for a judicial opinion on the validity
of the Stamp Act); Letter from Francis Bernard to the Bd. of Trade (Mar. 10, 1766), in 3 PAPERS
OF FRANCIS BERNARD 111, 112 (Colin Nicolson ed., 2013) (describing the opinion of the judges on
whether to proceed with the opening of the courts in Massachusetts).
184. JAY, supra note 38, at 75; Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme
Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 128–30, 145 n.101.
185. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (July 12, 1793), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, app. at 744 (Maeva Marcus
ed., 1998) [hereinafter DHSC]; see also Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (July
18, 1793), in DHSC, supra, app. at 745 (“[Q]uere, would a verbal communication, & explanation of
the wishes of Government made to them by you be better than by letter?”).
186. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. (July 18, 1793), in DHSC, supra note
185, app. at 747.
187. Questions to Be Posed to the U.S. Sup. Ct. C.J. & JJ. (July 18, 1793), DHSC, supra note
185, app. at 747, 751 n.8.
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In short, Washington and his cabinet seem to have considered
the propriety of advisory opinions an open question.188 The response of
the Justices reinforces this impression. Rather than immediately
refusing to give advice, four of them—Chief Justice Jay and Justices
Wilson, Iredell, and Patterson—described the issue as one “of much
Difficulty as well as Importance.”189 They declined to answer without
consulting the other two members of the Court, Justices Cushing and
Blair, who were out of town.190 That meant a three-week delay until
August, when the Court next met. Although Cushing was still absent
at that meeting, the other five Justices determined that they were
unable to oblige the Washington Administration, and they sent their
famous letter of refusal on August 8. This is its key sentence:
The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments of
Government—their being in certain Respects checks on each other—and our being Judges
of a court in the last Resort—are Considerations which afford strong arguments against
the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to; especially as
the Power given by the Constitution to the President of calling on the Heads of
Departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly limited to
executive Departments.191

The next two Parts
consequential passage.

will

consider

the

meaning

of

that

IV. RECONSIDERING EXISTING EXPLANATIONS
Between 1760 and 1793, judges on three continents expressed
new opposition to advisory opinions. Although no one declared them to
be categorically forbidden, judges in England and the United States
effectively ended the practice, and judges in Bengal came close. The
next two Parts explain why. This Part begins that work by
reconsidering existing explanations for what happened in the United
States, as well as their potential application to events in the
British Empire.
A. Constitutional
The orthodox view of the Correspondence focuses on two
constitutional concerns: that advisory opinions violate the separation of
188. See Amanda L. Tyler, Assessing the Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon: A Word
of Caution, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1747 (2015) (emphasizing the unsettled nature of the
issue at the Founding).
189. Letter from John Jay, James Wilson, James Iredell & William Paterson, JJ., U.S. Sup.
Ct., to George Washington (July 20, 1793), in 6 DHSC, supra note 185, app. at 752.
190. Id. app. at 753 n.2.
191. Letter from U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), supra note 2, at 545.
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powers and that they are not a proper exercise of the judicial power
conferred by Article III. Obviously, the U.S. Constitution can’t explain
earlier developments in the British Empire. But one might try to
salvage this argument by recasting it in more general terms.
First, let’s consider whether an intensified commitment to the
separation of powers—a commitment reflected in, but not caused by,
Article III—led judges in Westminster, Calcutta, and Philadelphia to
reject an advisory role. Even this more general approach turns out to
be a bad fit. No constitutional revolution preceded the demise of
advisory opinions in England.192 Well into the nineteenth century,
judges continued to swear an oath to advise the king.193 Meanwhile,
they continued to engage in activities that would strike us as
inconsistent with a strong view of separation of powers. For example,
they continued to draft legislation and to serve in the House of Lords,
Privy Council, and cabinet.194
There was a similar pattern in Bengal. Although the judges
there resisted advisory opinions, they regularly collaborated with the
governor-general and Council in other respects, such as by helping to
draft legislation.195 Chief Justice Impey even argued “that a Member of
the Court [should] always be a Member of the Council.”196
The separation-of-powers approach doesn’t even fit the
American story. As is well known, some of the first Justices served
simultaneously in the executive branch.197 It is hard to see why an
advisory opinion would have offended the separation of powers while
serving as an ambassador or secretary of state did not.198 Even more
striking is evidence from the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which
192. See JAY, supra note 38, at 6.
193. See supra note 48.
194. See LEMMINGS, supra note 58, at 289–91; Kadens, supra note 60, at 156.
195. See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert Chambers, S.C. Lemaistre & John Hyde (Mar. 30,
1776), IOR H/124, at 427 (on file with the British Library); Letter from Elijah Impey to Edward
Thurlow (Mar. 3, 1776), Add. Ms. 16259, at 26 (on file with the British Library).
196. Letter from Elijah Impey to Lord North (Oct. 19, 1776), Add. Ms. 16266, at 31v (on file
with the British Library); see also CURLEY, supra note 12, at 262 (describing Chambers’s ambition
to get a council seat).
197. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789-1815, at 413–14 (2009); Wheeler, supra note 184.
198. See infra notes 213–214 and accompanying text. In 1803, St. George Tucker complained
that the Chief Justices’ simultaneous employment as foreign envoys was “in manifest violation of
every constitutional principle.” 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES
OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. at 356 n.* (Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803).
Interestingly, he also thought that federal judges had been less scrupulous about the separation of
powers than their English counterparts in this respect. In his view, the Constitution protected
judges’ independence, but it made no significant innovation in separating judges from the
executive. Id. app. at 356–57.
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has been said to exemplify Founding-era ideas about the separation of
powers.199 That document required judges to give advisory opinions.200
There is one piece of evidence that has made “separation of
powers” seem plausible: the Justices’ invocation of the “Lines of
Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments
of Government.”201 But, as others have observed, that statement merely
indicated the Justices’ power to say no—not their inability to say yes.202
Their reference to the Opinion Clause served a similar purpose.203 The
Constitution’s text and structure, the Justices were saying, had created
a judiciary that was independent of the president.204 But “independent”
does not entail “unable to help.”
Shifting the focus from separation of powers to judicial
independence also helps to make sense of events in England and India.
The SCJ, which had been chartered by the Crown, was meant to be
independent of the Company-controlled Council. Its justices understood
that, and they expressly grounded their refusal to advise in their not
being subject to its jurisdiction.205 English judges lacked that degree of
formal autonomy, but they arguably enjoyed an even greater degree of
functional independence. Starting with the Glorious Revolution in
1688, judges had acquired increasingly strong protections against
removal.206 In 1761, Parliament closed a loophole that had allowed
judges to be replaced upon the death of the monarch.207 Importantly,
George III had recommended that change shortly after his accession,
offering a strong signal that the Crown itself supported the
independence of judges.208 Additionally, the judges of Westminster Hall,
199. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
434 (2d ed. 1998); Barbara Aronstein Black, Who Judges? Who Cares? History Now and Then, 36
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 749, 795 (2010).
200. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 3, art. 2, amended by MASS. CONST. art. 75; see infra Appendix
(describing requirements for advisory opinions).
201. Letter from U.S. Sup. Ct. JJ. to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), supra note 2, at 545.
202. CASTO, supra note 36, at 113.
203. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 656–
57 (1996).
204. Frankfurter, supra note 29, at 479, 483. This is not to say that the Justices’ understanding
was identical to modern theories of judicial independence. Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and
Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 467–71 (2018) (showing the historical
contingency of several rules we associate today with judicial independence).
205. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
206. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 656 (2009); Daniel M.
Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth
Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 3, 6 (2005).
207. Commissions and Salaries of Judges Act 1760, 1 Geo. 3, c. 23, s. I.
208. Contemporaries disagreed about the practical importance of the Act. Compare 1 HORACE
WALPOLE, MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE THIRD 35 (Denis Le Marchant ed.,
Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1845) (describing the statute as a “trifling addition” to judges’
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unlike their counterparts in Bengal, could rely on the close supervision
by Parliament and the press to support their claims to autonomy.209
Judicial independence was a necessary precondition for the decline of
advisory opinions. But the ability to say no is not the same as a duty to
do so.
That leaves the second constitutional objection: that
extrajudicial opinions are, as the term suggests, not an exercise of the
judicial power granted by Article III. The statement is true but
tautological. As William Baude and others have explained, the judicial
power is a court’s “power to issue binding judgments.”210 By definition,
extrajudicial opinions didn’t invoke that power. Indeed, they weren’t
issued by a court at all, but by the subscribing judges.211 The question,
then, is not whether advisory opinions abuse the Article III power but
whether the Constitution prohibits judges from engaging in additional
activities. But as we’ve just seen, common-law judges sustained various
extrajudicial activities after advisory opinions ceased.
B. Prudential
Sensing the weakness of the constitutional case, some scholars
have described the Correspondence as a prudential response to the
practical disadvantages of advisory opinions. In particular, Professors
Golove and Hulsebosch have argued that the Justices sought to enhance
their international credibility by emphasizing their separation from the
executive branch.
This argument rightly focuses on the potential audience of
advisory opinions.212 And it seems clear that the Justices often acted
already-secure tenure), with 1 JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 587 (H. Milford ed.,
Oxford University Press 1924) (reporting Johnson’s criticism of the Act as overly protective of
judges). See also EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 79 (1944) (arguing for the
importance of the Act).
209. David Lemmings has argued that judicial independence remained imperfect in the
eighteenth century. Judicial salaries were often in arrears, which gave the Treasury some leverage
over them; post-retirement pensions remained discretionary until 1799; and the executive could
offer peerages and other douceurs to judges and their families. Moreover, between 1714 and 1760,
Britain effectively had one-party rule, and the appointment process tended to produce judges who
were sympathetic to the dominant Whig regime. LEMMINGS, supra note 58, at 271–74. But the
intensification of partisan conflict after 1760 would have mitigated these concerns: any effort to
compromise judges’ independence would have provoked an immediate backlash from the
opposition. Id. at 282–86.
210. William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1809 (2007); accord Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995).
211. See TOPF, supra note 18, at xiv–xv (distinguishing between requests made to a state
supreme court and those made to the Justices of the Court); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, Advisory
Opinions, in LEGAL ESSAYS 42, 49 (Ezra Ripley Thayer ed.,1908) (noting that advisory opinions in
Massachusetts were not binding).
212. See infra Section V.B (discussing potential misuses of advisory opinions).

656

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3:621

with an eye toward foreign observers. But there are at least two reasons
to doubt that the Correspondence was primarily aimed abroad. First,
this theory hits the same stumbling block as the traditional separationof-powers approach: the repeated tendency of Chief Justices to serve in
the executive branch—and, specifically, to serve as diplomats. Most
strikingly, Chief Justice Jay accepted an appointment as envoy to Great
Britain less than a year after he signed the Correspondence.213 His two
immediate successors also took significant public roles in foreign
affairs.214 If refusing to issue an advisory opinion was a way to tell the
world that the judiciary and the executive were unconnected, the Chief
Justice and his successors muddled the message.
Second, it’s not clear that foreign observers would have cared.215
Consider Britain’s own experience with a neutrality dispute—the socalled Silesian loan affair, which involved its seizure of neutral
Prussian ships during the War of the Austrian Succession.216 During
that crisis, the British government had its law officers prepare a report
on Britain’s view of applicable international law.217 The report—which
had been commissioned to fortify Britain’s credibility among European
diplomats218—“acquired a great reputation and is looked upon as one of
the most important international documents of the 18th century.”219 Its

213. John Jay: Appointment as Chief Justice in 1789, in 1 DHSC, supra note 185, at 3, 7;
Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 34, at 1042. He had also continued as Secretary for Foreign
Affairs for his first six months on the bench. John Jay: Appointment as Chief Justice in 1789,
supra, at 3, 6.
214. Chief Justice Rutledge was a recess appointee who was denied Senate confirmation after
he publicly denounced the Jay Treaty. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 90–95 (1995).
Rutledge’s replacement, Oliver Ellsworth, served overseas as a diplomat while Chief Justice.
Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1707, 1741 (2018);
Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1745 & n.174 (1998).
215. When Jefferson told the French minister, Edmond Charles Genet, that federal courts
would need to adjudicate certain matters in dispute between the two countries, he replied that he
was “ignorant . . . of the constitutional judges” to whom Jefferson referred. Letter from Edmond
Charles Genet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France, to Thomas Jefferson, Sec’y of
State (June 22, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 155, 156 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair
Clarke eds., Washington, D.C., Gales & Seaton 1833); cf. JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR:
NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 97 (2001) (describing Genet as “confused” by U.S.
constitutional law).
216. See SHAVANA MUSA, VICTIM REPARATION UNDER THE IUS POST BELLUM: AN HISTORICAL
AND NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE 74–85 (2018).
217. GEORGE LEE, G. PAUL, DUDLEY RYDER & WILLIAM MURPHY, REPORT OF THE LAW
OFFICERS OF THE CROWN (Jan. 18, 1753), reprinted in ERNEST SATOW, THE SILESIAN LOAN AND
FREDERICK THE GREAT 77, 77–100 (1915).
218. See J. LL. J. EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN 134 (1964) (noting that the
opinion was “communicated . . . to the British Ministers in the leading European capitals for
presentation to the courts in which they were accredited”); SATOW, supra note 217, at 73.
219. Arnold D. McNair, The Debt of International Law in Britain to the Civil Law and the
Civilians, 39 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 183, 195 (1953).
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admirers included Vattel, Montesquieu, Alexander Hamilton, and
Edmund Randolph.220 Nobody seems to have cared that most of its
authors were executive officers.221 In fact, as Golove and Hulsebosch
observe elsewhere, a close association between the Justices and the
executive branch might actually have enhanced the Court’s credibility.
In 1790, when a senator wanted to reassure a British diplomat that
Chief Justice Jay would treat foreign litigants fairly, he elided the
distinction between Jay’s political and judicial roles: “[I]s it possible to
suppose, that what he openly acknowledged in his political character,
will not equally affect his decisions on the Bench?”222
C. Political
This leaves explanations that emphasize the Justices’ domestic
political priorities. Professors Arlyck, Casto, and Jay, for example, all
see the Justices as trying to steer clear of the contentious field of foreign
relations—whether to save themselves political trouble, to boost
the presidency as an institution, or to encourage the President’s
Federalist policies.
As with the other two explanations, this one hits on an
important truth. Eighteenth-century judges worried that executive
officials might use advisory opinions to dodge political accountability.
Impey justified the judges’ refusal to answer one inquiry by explaining
that an advisory opinion would “in some measure remove the
responsibility . . . to ourselves.”223 Chancellor Robert Livingston of New
York used more colorful language in 1801. Advisory opinions, he
warned, would “convert [judges] into mantelets to receive the shot,

220. See, e.g., HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE
PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1787, at 181–82 (1977); EMER DE VATTEL, THE
LAW OF NATIONS 304 n.* (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758);
Alexander Hamilton, To Defence No. XX [New York, Oct. 23 and 24, 1795], in 19 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JULY 1795–DECEMBER 1975, at 329, 342–43 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973);
Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 12, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 537, 538 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992).
221. The authors were Sir George Lee, the Dean of the Arches; George Paul, the King’s
Advocate; Attorney General Dudley Ryder; and Solicitor General William Murray. Of these, only
Lee was a judge. (He presided over the ecclesiastical court of the Archbishop of Canterbury.)
222. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 34, at 1015 (quoting Letter from Lord Dorchester to Mr.
Grenville (May 27, 1790)). One might also cite the example of prize cases, “which were among the
most numerous and important types of cases raising questions under the law of nations at the
time.” Id. at 1003. In Britain, prize appeals were decided by the Lords Commissioners for Prize
Appeals, a majority of whom had to be members of the Privy Council—a fundamentally executive
body. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 220, at 18, 161–77; supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
223. Letter from Elijah Impey to Lord Bathurst (Oct. 19, 1776), Add. Ms. 16266, at 32v (on file
with the British Library).
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while the leaders of parties fought securely under their protection.”224
This concern became more salient in the later eighteenth century. The
three places where we’ve seen judges resist advisory opinions—England
in the 1760s, Bengal in the 1770s, and the United States in the 1790s—
were all sites of intense partisan conflict, where judges would have been
especially attuned to questions of political responsibility.
Where these accounts fall short, however, is in not accounting
for the risks of refusing to advise.225 In the late eighteenth century,
extrajudicial silence wasn’t always the safer course. George II became
enraged when he thought Mansfield was trying to dodge his advisory
duties in Sackville’s Case.226 Indeed, the Duke of Newcastle was
convinced that the incident would lead to his friend’s downfall.227
Throughout his career, Mansfield was criticized because of his supposed
proclivity for saying in private what he refused to say in public.228 In
contrast, the unanimous opinion in Sackville’s Case proved
uncontroversial, as did most advisory opinions. If a judge’s goal was to
stay out of trouble, joining a unanimous opinion was the surer path.229
Impey got even more grief for his reluctance. In 1786, he faced
impeachment on various charges of misconduct as chief justice. The
third article cited his refusal to give an advisory opinion on “the Limits
of the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”230 Impey, the article charged,
not only “did decline giving any satisfactory Answer,” but “did persuade
the other Judges to declare, in Conjunction with himself, that they had
no Authority to make, extrajudicially, any particular Description of the
Powers of the Court, other than is given in the Charter of their
Establishment.”231 This charge was quickly dropped (and Impey was
eventually acquitted on all counts), but its inclusion suggests that his
extrajudicial silence had been costly. Impey himself seems to have
anticipated this. A decade earlier, he had responded to the SCJ’s critics
224. Letter from Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, Governor of New York (Mar. 21, 1801), in
2 STATE OF NEW YORK: MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS 481, 482 (Charles Z. Lincoln ed., 1909).
225. For additional critiques, see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 34, at 1027 n.360.
226. See supra notes 102, 116–118 and accompanying text.
227. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to [Andrew] Stone, supra note 116, at 10 (“I see a Run
coming on upon [Mansfield] for preventing (as they think) the asking the opinion of the Judges,
some time ago . . . . I foresee such a storm as no man can stand.”).
228. See, e.g., Letter from “Junius” to Lord Mansfield (Nov. 14, 1770), in THE LETTERS OF
JUNIUS 206, 215 (John Cannon ed., 1978) [hereinafter JUNIUS]. Interestingly, the “Junius” letters
were likely written by Philip Francis. See John Cannon, Appendix Eight: A Note on Authorship, in
JUNIUS, supra, at 539.
229. The opinion in Sackville’s Case repeated a conclusion already reached by the Attorney
and Solicitor General. See supra note 106.
230. ARTICLES OF CHARGE OF HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, AGAINST SIR ELIJAH IMPEY
108 (Dublin, John Stockdale 1788).
231. Id.
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by emphasizing that its justices “have given extrajudicial opinions at
the desire of the Governor and Council.”232 His defenders likewise
praised his willingness to write advisory opinions.233 They did
not mention that he had rendered those opinions infrequently and
under protest.
The Correspondence was far less controversial, but that might
not have been clear in advance. Some contemporaries thought that the
president was “authorized to require in writing” “the opinion of the
judges,” including on questions about “the laws of nations.”234 As
Professor Jay observes, the early Supreme Court was not universally
loved, and it would have been plausible for its critics to attack it for
failing to assist President Washington.
Thus, “political” explanations of the Correspondence are right to
focus on questions of accountability. Advisory opinions were indeed
risky, and they could be used to shift responsibility from policymakers
to judges. But silence wasn’t safe, either. Something beyond risk
aversion must have pushed judges to end their advisory practice.
V. COMPLETING THE STORY
The last Part showed that existing accounts can’t fully explain
the Correspondence or the decline of advisory opinions more generally.
This Part develops a new explanation, which focuses on changes within
the common law.
The classical attitude toward advisory opinions had depended on
a jurisprudence that treated all legal opinions as probative, but none as
decisive, in determining the law’s meaning.235 Starting in the 1750s,
that view of legal authority came under pressure. The declaratory
232. Letter from Elijah Impey to Lord Weymouth (Jan. 20, 1776), Add. Ms. 38398, at 220, 240v
(on file with the British Library).
233. See, e.g., Letter from Warren Hastings to Lord North (Jan. 20, 1776), in 2 HASTINGS
MEMOIRS, supra note 132, at 14; Considerations on East India Affairs, ([after 1774]), Add. Ms.
38398, at 107, 113 (on file with the British Library):
The Establishment of the Court of Judicature in Bengal has done some good, & some
mischief. The good it has done in some particular Instances makes me think it should
be continued; . . . It has in two Instances wisely upon application interposed with its
advice, & thereby prevented great confusion in two of the Settlements.
234. “A Native American,” Letter to the Editor, CITY GAZETTE & DAILY ADVERTISER
(Charleston, S.C.), Sept. 16, 1793, at 2; see also 11 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 4, 1789–MARCH 3, 1791, at 927, 931 (June 17,
1789) (statement of Rep. Gerry) (“There is a clause in this system of government . . . which
authorises the president to obtain the opinions of the heads of departments in writing; so the
president and senate may require the opinion of the judges respecting this power if they have any
doubts concerning it.”). These arguments seem absurd today—they cite the Opinion Clause in
support of advisory opinions—but that doesn’t mean that they might not have caused trouble.
235. See supra Section II.A.

660

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3:621

theory remained orthodox, but it began to fragment. Some judges, most
prominently Blackstone, began to elevate the authority of individual
cases into a newly powerful theory of stare decisis; others, most notably
Mansfield, tended to emphasize cases’ underlying principles. Those
subtle differences in emphasis created new anxiety about the nature of
legal authority. As judges and lawyers realized their disagreement,
they tried to develop clearer rules about what counted as evidence of
the law.
Advisory opinions were a casualty of this process. There was
little doubt that a judge’s extrajudicial writings ought to carry less
weight than the opinion accompanying a judgment. But it was difficult
to say how much less when the profession couldn’t agree about how to
treat judgments themselves. Judges began to worry that their advisory
pronouncements would be misused in ways that might harm both the
development of the law and their own reputations. In response to these
concerns, judges intensified their long-standing caution about issuing
advisory opinions, until the practice died out entirely.
A. The Problem of Legal Authority
The common law experienced a crisis in the middle of the
eighteenth century.236 Britain’s rapid economic growth led many
observers to conclude that English law was unfit for a modern
commercial society,237 a suspicion reinforced by litigants’ flight from the
courts.238 Judges and lay observers lamented the law’s uncertainty,
while a surge of parliamentary activity raised new questions about the
roles of courts and legislators in reforming the law.239 Meanwhile,
Britain’s imperial expansion created new stages on which to display the
inadequacies of English law.240

236. LEMMINGS, supra note 58, at 144.
237. See, e.g., David Lieberman, Property, Commerce, and the Common Law: Attitudes to Legal
Change in the Eighteenth Century, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 144 (John
Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995); David Lieberman, The Legal Needs of a Commercial Society:
The Jurisprudence of Lord Kames, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 203, 205–06 (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff eds., 1986).
238. See C.W. Brooks, Interpersonal Conflict and Social Tension: Civil Litigation in England,
1640–1830, in THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN ENGLISH HISTORY IN HONOUR OF LAWRENCE
STONE 357, 359 (A.L. Beier, David Cannadine & James M. Rosenheim eds., 2005); Christian R.
Burset, Arbitrating the England Problem: Litigation, Private Ordering, and the Rise of the Modern
Economy, 36 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561136
[https://perma.cc/6JRF-V6AN].
239. DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 11–30 (1989).
240. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Place and Time [1782], in SELECTED WRITINGS 152 (Stephen
G. Engelmann ed., 2011).
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One response to this crisis was increased attention to the nature
of legal authority. Perhaps the most prominent examples of this were
found in the competing approaches of Blackstone and Mansfield.
Blackstone argued for “a relatively new and stronger understanding of
the binding nature of precedent.”241 In his account of the common law,
judges swore oaths to decide cases according to law, not their own
discretion. Because that law was knowable through precedents, they
bound judges in later cases. Mansfield, in contrast, took a more relaxed
approach to case law. Precedents, in his view, were authoritative not
because they provided specific rules that judges must follow, but
because they revealed the law’s underlying principles. A judge’s job was
to conform his decision to those principles—not the specific rules of
particular cases. Therefore, a judge could overrule cases that had been
decided wrongly or had aged poorly.242
The difference between these two approaches was subtle.
Occasionally, the jurisprudential gap between Blackstone and
Mansfield erupted conspicuously.243 Usually, though, it lurked below
the surface. Both judges embraced a variant of the declaratory theory,
and it wasn’t obvious whose approach best represented contemporary
orthodoxy.244 The result was a legal system in which the participants
disagreed about the nature of precedent but were not always able to
articulate how or why.245
This sometimes-silent disagreement about case law had
collateral consequences for other kinds of legal authority. Blackstone
had identified as evidence of the common law not only prior cases but
also “the authoritative writings of the venerable sages of the law,”
which have “intrinsic authority in the courts of justice.”246 But how were
such writings to be weighed against judicial decisions, or against each
other? Jeremy Bentham, writing in the 1770s, mocked the absence of
any “common scale”: “Every man, pleader or judge, makes up for himself
fragments of such a scale, pro re nata, as it happens: and whether in

241.
242.
243.
244.

Kadens, supra note 51, at 1558.
See LIEBERMAN, supra note 239, at 86–87.
See Burset, supra note 91 (discussing the controversy surrounding Perrin v. Blake).
See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 239, at 3; MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850, at 98–114 (1991); Kadens, supra note 51, at 1556 & n.12.
245. Cf. Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L.
REV. 529, 530–31 (1991) (describing a similar phenomenon in twentieth-century doctrines of
personal jurisdiction).
246. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *72–73.
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any case that of the pleader shall happen to be the same with that of
the Judge is a matter of [chance].”247
Bentham wasn’t alone in recognizing this problem. Some judges
responded to it by developing a norm (frequently but erroneously
attributed to the nineteenth century248) against citing living authors.
Bentham himself suggested that such a convention was emerging in his
own day.249 Mansfield had invoked it a few years earlier, when he
blocked a barrister from citing Blackstone’s Commentaries because
their author lived.250 Blackstone himself drew the line not between
living and dead but between ancient and modern.251 But these
guidelines remained flexible and contested;252 it is revealing not only
that Mansfield refused to hear the Commentaries cited but also that a
barrister had considered them citable.253 (The barrister, incidentally,
was Elijah Impey.254)
Judges also tried to develop a scale for weighing opinions of
counsel. Traditionally, the opinions of eminent lawyers had enjoyed
247. JEREMY BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM: A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 1, 210
(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977).
248. See Alexandra Braun, Burying the Living? The Citation of Legal Writings in English
Courts, 58 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 27, 33 (2010) (arguing that the rule emerged at least by the early
nineteenth century); Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Judges and Professors—Ships Passing in the
Night?, 77 RABEL J. COMPAR. & INT’L PRIV. L. 233, 235 (2013). This rule is sometimes referred to
as “better read when dead.” DUXBURY, supra note 62, at 78. (A warning, perhaps, to professors
who thirst to be cited.)
249. BENTHAM, supra note 247, at 211.
250. Postscript, LONDON EVENING POST, May 15–17, 1770, at 4 (reporting Mansfield’s
statement that “he would suffer no such references in that Court; for though the work alluded to
was of much utility to the public, and would be remembered and applied to, when the author was
no more, yet, while living, he thought it unnecessary, as well as improper”). Awkwardly,
Blackstone was on the bench at the time. Id.
251. See BENTHAM, supra note 247, at 209–10; see also JOHN DALRYMPLE, AN ESSAY TOWARDS
A GENERAL HISTORY OF FEUDAL PROPERTY IN GREAT BRITAIN, at xi (London, A. Millar 4th ed. 1759)
(explaining why he quoted “some modern writers . . . who may perhaps not be quoted as
authorities in courts of law”). Mansfield also seems to have been skeptical of the newly departed.
In 1774, when a barrister cited Vattel (d. 1767), Mansfield asked, “Does he quote any
authorities?”—suggesting that while the Swiss jurist was citable, he was not an “authority”
himself. Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 848, 879; Lofft. 655, 710 (K.B.).
252. James Ram’s influential treatise found it “difficult, in some cases, to draw the line of
partition between books that are, and books that are not, authority.” Ram thought the key question
was whether the author was a judge. JAMES RAM, THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL JUDGMENT 92–93
(London, A. Maxwell 1834).
253. See, e.g., Kadens, supra note 60, at 164–65 (describing citations of modern authors at oral
argument and in jury instructions); cf. DAWSON, supra note 47, at 97 (describing the rule against
citing living authors as “only a rule of etiquette”). Francis Hargrave suggested that he cited
Blackstone’s Commentaries to Mansfield in Somerset’s Case (1772), but he also admits that the
printed report of his argument was “entirely a written composition” created for publication, so its
accuracy is questionable. The Case of James Sommersett, in 20 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS, 1771–1777, supra note 166, at 1, 23 n.*, 28.
254. Postscript, supra note 250, at 4.

2021]

ADVISORY OPINIONS & LEGAL AUTHORITY

663

significant authority, but only as evidence of what the profession
thought.255 Over the course of the eighteenth century, however, judges
and lawyers increasingly cited individual opinions as authoritative in
themselves.256 In 1749, for example, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke
described an opinion that he had coauthored while attorney general
(known as the Yorke-Talbot opinion) as having settled certain questions
about the legal status of slavery.257 Hardwicke’s self-citation reflected a
growing tendency to treat the opinions of eminent lawyers as
potentially decisive.258 But, as with treatises, the weight of such
opinions was contested.259 When counsel cited the Yorke-Talbot opinion
to Mansfield in 1772, he discounted its authority because it had been
given “in Lincoln’s Inn Hall after dinner.”260 Maybe Yorke and Talbot
had too much to drink when they declared slavery compatible with
English law.261
Two years later, Mansfield offered a more systematic treatment
of lawyers’ opinions in Campbell v. Hall.262 At argument, Francis
Hargrave cited an opinion given in 1689 by Sir John Somers and Sir
George Treby. Mansfield asked whether the case had been referred to
them in their official capacities as attorney and solicitor general—
implying that an official opinion might carry more weight.263 But his
opinion ultimately declined to pursue that distinction. Instead, he
stated that “opinions of counsel, whether acting officially in a public
charge or in private, are not properly authority to found a decision,” but
merely evidence of what lawyers at the time had thought.264 But not
255. See BAKER, supra note 59, at 87–89.
256. Sir John Baker has observed that in the eighteenth century, it “became a common practice
for opinions [of counsel] to be transcribed into volumes for future reference,” although historians
have yet to explain why. Id. at 88.
257. Pearne v. Lisle (1749) 27 Eng. Rep. 47, 48; Amb. 75, 76–77.
258. American land speculators famously cited a “garbled version” of another opinion to justify
land purchases from “Indians,” even though a royal proclamation had barred such transactions.
(The opinion’s authors had been writing about South Asians, not Native Americans.) STUART
BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND 101–03 (2005); JACK M. SOSIN, WHITEHALL AND THE
WILDERNESS: THE MIDDLE WEST IN BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1760–1775, at 230–34, 259–
67 (1961).
259. See, e.g., RAM, supra note 252, at 93–94 (quoting with approval Justice Buller’s
declaration that “opinions given by eminent men at the bar . . . have no weight in the scale of
justice,” but noting instances in which judges cited or relied on such opinions).
260. Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 503; Lofft. 1, 8.
261. Cf. 2 FRANCIS MASERES, THE CANADIAN FREEHOLDER 297–99 (London, B. White 1779)
(critiquing another opinion by Yorke as “given very hastily and with very little attention”).
262. Campbell v. Hall (1774), in 20 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 1771–1777,
supra note 166, at 239.
263. Id. at 300 (“Is it referred to them as officers of the crown?”).
264. Id. at 326 (emphasis added). Later, Mansfield hinted that judicial dicta might outweigh
opinions of counsel. See id. at 344 (“[N]o book, no saying of a judge, no not even an opinion of any
counsel public or private, has been cited . . . .”).
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everyone agreed. Several decades later, the lawyer and imperial
bureaucrat George Chalmers described the opinions of the Crown’s law
officers as “of little less authority, than decided law.”265
One reason that treatises and opinions of counsel were so
attractive to cite was their textual reliability. Eighteenth-century law
reporting was messy. Judges did not send their opinions to the printer.
Instead, they pronounced their decisions from the bench; what made it
into print depended on what reporters happened to write down.266 The
quality of those reports varied widely.267 “At present, I am always
uncertain whether what is printed be a faithful report or not,” one
pamphleteer complained; “it comes with no authority, but from some
private hand.”268 In response, Mansfield tapped James Burrow as the
first authorized reporter of King’s Bench decisions. But even Burrow
provided only paraphrases of what judges said.269 As a result, lawyers
remained hungry for judges’ actual words, even if they came from
questionable sources. One prominent law reporter noted that “Mr.
Baron Maseres has told me” that Justice Willes had disagreed with
Mansfield’s opinion in Campbell.270 The dissent wasn’t noted in other
reports, and this game of telephone was the only indication in print that
the decision hadn’t been unanimous.271
Unlike judicial decisions, treatises and opinions of counsel came
straight from their authors’ pens. John Reeves, a barrister and colonial
judge, acknowledged that the “opinions of law-officers” lacked the
265. GEORGE CHALMERS, OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS, ON VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH
JURISPRUDENCE, at xxi–xxii (London, Reed & Hunter 1814); see also Alexander Du Toit, Chalmers,
George, in DNB, supra note 11, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/5028 [https://perma.cc/V5APWJNJ] (outlining Chalmers’s life as a lawyer and English bureaucrat).
266. Tiersma, supra note 60, at 1200–01; see also Maeva Marcus, Wilson as a Justice, 17 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 158 (2019) (noting that federal courts were not required to issue written
opinions in the 1790s).
267. See T.T. Arvind & Christian R. Burset, A New Report of Entick v. Carrington (1765), 110
KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 18–28), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529420
[https://perma.cc/SBZ3-CUJQ] (discussing differences between the various reports of an
eighteenth-century case).
268. ANOTHER LETTER TO MR. ALMON, IN MATTER OF LIBEL 147 (London, J. Almon 2d ed.
1771); see also Francis Hargrave, Preface, in 1 COLLECTANEA JURIDICA: CONSISTING OF TRACTS
RELATIVE TO THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, at A2 (Francis Hargrave ed., London, E.
& R. Brooke 1791) (“[I]t must necessarily happen under the present want of regulation for an
authentic and a continued publication of the Adjudications of our Courts of Law, that many
important authorities will be left to float on the uncertain surface of tradition . . . .”).
269. DAWSON, supra note 47, at 79. Unlike some reporters at the time, Burrow didn’t know
shorthand. Id. And even eighteenth-century shorthand systems “did not allow reporters to capture
verbatim text.” See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 23–24 (2015).
270. Addenda—The Case of the Island of Grenada (Campbell v. Hall), in 20 A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 1771–1777, supra note 166, at 1387, 1389.
271. See Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045; 1 Cowp. 204 (containing no mention of
any dissenting opinions).
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“juridical authority” of “opinions delivered by judges upon the bench.”272
Nonetheless, he chose to rely on them in his well-regarded treatise on
navigation laws. “[T]he opinions of lawyers have an advantage which
[judicial opinions] have not,” he explained; “they come down to us in the
writing of the author . . . the opinions of courts, on the other hand, are
usually conveyed by standers-by.”273 Advisory opinions had the same
advantage—with the added benefit of having been given by the very
“oracles which speak in our courts.”274
There was another reason that advisory opinions were so
alluring. Unlike ordinary cases, which were heard by the four members
of a single court, advisory opinions were generally signed by all twelve
common-law judges, which made the final product look enticingly
authoritative. We can appreciate the effect of all those signatures by
considering the phenomenon of twelve-judge decisions—an informal
process of appellate review in which the judges of King’s Bench,
Common Pleas, and Exchequer consulted on difficult cases. Technically,
twelve-judge deliberations were extrajudicial, and they served merely
to advise the judge or judges who were actually hearing the case.
Nonetheless, as James Oldham has shown, the resulting opinions “were
at times considered to be weightier than decisions by only one of the
common law courts.”275 At times. Foster v. Thackary (1781) provides an
extreme example of the uncertainty this might cause. That case “was
never finally decided and was never made public,” but counsel later
cited it as precedent.276 Justice Buller also cited it as “a case of
considerable authority”; but he wrote in dissent, so his colleagues
presumably disagreed.277
In short, conditions were ideal for advisory opinions to be used
in ways that their authors did not intend. Inadequate law reporting
encouraged lawyers to seize on authentic texts, even if they had less
authority than judicial opinions. The fragmentation of the declaratory
theory meant that practitioners and judges disagreed about how much
weight to give those second-tier texts. Bentham’s sneering description
of “the whole affair of authority” as plunged into “glorious uncertainty”
272. JOHN REEVES, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION 9 (London, E. & R.
Brooke 1792).
273. Id. at 9–10.
274. See id. at 9.
275. Oldham, supra note 25, at 193–94 (emphasis added).
276. Id. at 196.
277. Good v. Elliott (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 808, 812; 3 T.R. 693, 702 (Buller, J., dissenting).
These considerations also explain why dicta survived even as advisory opinions declined. First,
everyone understood that dicta in a law report weren’t the judge’s actual words; they were, in a
very real sense, the words of a reporter. See Tiersma, supra note 60, at 1208. Second, dicta were
usually attributed to a single judge.
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was unusually caustic but not inaccurate.278 The situation would have
been even more confusing for lay readers, who often failed to appreciate
the nuances of contemporary jurisprudence.279 Judges responded to this
environment by trying to curtail their advisory activities.
B. Rethinking the Refusals
Advisory opinions had worked when everyone agreed what they
signified. By the 1760s, however, a judge who signed onto such an
opinion had to worry that readers might put it to very different uses
from what had been intended. And the stakes of misuse were growing.
Although Britain had experienced political conflict throughout the
eighteenth century, partisan divisions reached a new pitch in the
1760s.280 During that time, judging came to be viewed not merely as
political but as partisan,281 and writers more frequently attributed
jurisprudential disagreements to judges’ bad faith.282 In that context,
judges had less reason to believe that their advisory opinions would be
given the provisional meaning that the classical common law had
accorded them. In response, judges intensified their long-standing
reluctance to give formal extrajudicial advice.
There were two concerns. The first was that a judge’s
adversaries might use an old opinion to embarrass him. Classical
advisory opinions had insisted on judges’ right to change their minds.
In Sackville’s Case, for example, the judges concluded by laying “in our
claim not to be bound by this answer.”283 But judges had reason to doubt
that readers would honor that claim. In 1767, for example, the Duke of

278. BENTHAM, supra note 247, at 211. Incidentally, the ironical phrase “the glorious
uncertainty of the law” appears to have been coined in 1756. Glorious, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
279. Cf. HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE, LAW MISCELLANIES 53 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1814)
(“The public opinion is that the courts are governed by decisions as if these made the law. . . . It
ought not to be so . . . and it is a great matter that it be understood by the people . . . .”).
280. See, e.g., JOHN BREWER, PARTY IDEOLOGY AND POPULAR POLITICS AT THE ACCESSION OF
GEORGE III, at 9 (1976); JUSTIN DU RIVAGE, REVOLUTION AGAINST EMPIRE: TAXES, POLITICS, AND
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 180 (2017) (describing the polarization of North
American political culture in the 1760s); JAMES M. VAUGHN, THE POLITICS OF EMPIRE AT THE
ACCESSION OF GEORGE III: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF
BRITAIN’S IMPERIAL STATE 71–72 (2019) (describing the rise of the radical Whig party in the 1760s).
281. During the reign of George II, judicial appointments had been controlled by a Whig
oligarchy. After the accession of George III in 1760, the instability of party politics led to greater
political diversity among judicial appointees—and a heightened potential for political conflict
among them. See LEMMINGS, supra note 58, at 285–88.
282. See, e.g., John Brewer, The Wilkites and the Law, 1763-74: A Study of Radical Notions of
Governance, in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE: THE ENGLISH AND THEIR LAW IN THE SEVENTEENTH
AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 128 (John Brewer & John Styles eds., 1980).
283. Supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Newcastle plotted to publicize an eight-year-old opinion that his
political rival, Lord Camden, had given when he was attorney general.
The old opinion contradicted the position Camden now sought to
advance in Parliament, and Newcastle assumed that Camden would
“have a Difficulty” opposing “a Point, which he has himself, in a formal
Report, declared.”284 Newcastle bragged about this tactic to his friend
Mansfield, who perhaps wondered whether he had any inconvenient
past opinions of his own.285 Newcastle should have understood that law
officers sometimes wrote things in their official capacities that might
not fully comport with their private views.286 But if politicians refused
to acknowledge that, how could judges trust them to recognize the
subtle difference between judicial and advisory opinions? Mansfield
himself got a taste of this in 1772, when the lawyer Charles Fearne
accused him of giving an opinion when he was solicitor general that
contradicted his later opinion on the bench.287 This did not bode well for
any judge who hoped to rethink an advisory opinion.
The second concern was that readers might distort the law by
imputing excessive authority to advisory opinions. During Impey’s
impeachment, a dispute arose about the admissibility of evidence. Sir
Lloyd Kenyon, the Master of the Rolls, told the House of Commons that
“the Judges were ready to give their opinion” as needed: “Upon all
disputed points the law would be pronounced from the Woolsack” (the
Lord Chancellor’s seat), “and what was so pronounced must be
considered as law.”288 Edmund Burke balked at that description of
judicial authority, and he warned that Kenyon “held too high an opinion
of the determination of the Judges.”289 Burke told the chamber that he
“had contended, and with success, against the unanimous opinion of the

284. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Bedford (May 23, 1767), Add. Ms. 32982,
at 99–100 (on file with the British Library).
285. Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Mansfield (May 24, 1767), Add. Ms. 32982, at
111 (on file with the British Library).
286. See, e.g., Debate in the Commons on the Resolutions for Restraining the East India
Company’s Dividends: Statement of Speaker Fletcher Norton (Mar. 23, 1773), in 17
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 73, at 813, 824 (“Respecting the opinion I formerly gave upon
the subject, being not then in office, it may be supposed a transcript of my real sentiments.”).
287. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Relevance of Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, in TEXTS AND
CONTEXTS IN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHARLES DONAHUE 413, 425 (John Witte, Jr.,
Sara McDougall & Anna Di Robilant eds., 2016). The allegation was serious enough that Mansfield
felt compelled to deny it from the bench. See Hodgson v. Ambrose (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 216, 220; 1
Dougl. 337, 343–44. The incident remained fodder for lawyerly gossip more than seventy years
later. JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 356 (2004).
288. Proceedings on the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey: Statement of Sir Lloyd Kenyon,
Master of the Rolls (Feb. 7, 1788), in 26 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 73, at 1340, 1424.
289. Proceedings on the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey: Statement of Edmund Burke (Feb.
7, 1788), in 26 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 73, at 1340, 1424.
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Judges,” which was worthy of respect but not infallible.290 Although
Kenyon was the front-runner to succeed Mansfield as Lord Chief
Justice, Burke hoped that he might wait “some time longer” before
getting promoted—“as it were, performing quarantine,” so that
he would not infect the bench with his diseased notions of
judicial supremacy.291
The exchange illustrated the ambiguities of contemporary
jurisprudence. Neither Kenyon nor Burke believed that judges could
make new law, particularly through extrajudicial declarations.292 But
they nonetheless disagreed about the evidentiary value of judges’
opinions. As a result, judges could not be sure whether their
extrajudicial pronouncements would be “considered as law,” as Kenyon
put it, or as contestable evidence of the law.293 This exchange wasn’t an
isolated occurrence. In Entick v. Carrington (1765), Lord Camden had
felt compelled to remind his listeners that “the Opinion of all the 12
Judges of England” could not “extrajudicially make a Law to bind
the Kingdom.”294
Impey himself had articulated this concern while he was still in
India. Although he resisted giving advisory opinions to executive
officials in Bengal, he and his colleagues were more willing to advise
courts from other British settlements in India, which were not within
the SCJ’s appellate jurisdiction. When giving that advice, Impey
warned that his “opinion must be understood as not carrying any
Authority with it from my station nor have any greater weight given to
it than that of a Counsel in England on a Cause laid before him. . . .
[A]ny advice we give must be understood private & not ex Officio.”295
Impey and his colleagues soon decided that those warnings were
insufficient, and a short time later, they declined to speak even in their
private capacities. “[I]f more weight were given to [our letter] than a
private Opinion deserves,” the judges explained, “it might create
Mischiefs that we forsee [sic] and many that can not possibly be

290. Id.
291. Id. Kenyon became Lord Chief Justice a few months later.
292. See, e.g., Good v. Elliott (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 808, 815; 3 Term. Rep. 693, 706
(Kenyon, C.J.).
293. Proceedings on the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey: Statement of Edmund Burke (Feb.
7, 1788), in 26 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 73, at 1424.
294. Arvind & Burset, supra note 267, at 62 (quoting a manuscript report of the case).
295. Letter from Elijah Impey to John Turing (Oct. 4, 1776), Add. Ms. 16265, at 129v–131v (on
file with the British Library); see also Letter from Elijah Impey to Andrew Ross (Oct. 11, 1776),
Add. Ms. 16266, at 26v (on file with the British Library) (asking that his opinion “be only
considered as the private opinion of a private Barrister”).
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foreseen.”296 In the increasingly vitriolic politics of British India, no
caveat could be strong enough to prevent misuse.
Later events justified that caution. Recall the judges’ opinion
about whether Warren Hastings had resigned.297 Although the judges
expressly denied that it had any intrinsic authority, Clavering and
Francis nonetheless called it a “judgment,” binding on them as parties
even though they disputed its reasoning.298 When the judges sent the
Council another letter a few days later to clarify their original
opinion,299 the councilors replied that they “regard[ed] it as legal
authority.”300 Richard Barwell later testified to a parliamentary
committee “that it would have been his duty” to follow the opinions of
the judges, even if he had disagreed with their advice.301 In other words,
he, too, treated it as a judgment, despite the judges’ insistence that it
was no such thing. But Barwell wasn’t even consistent in overvaluing
advisory opinions. He told the same committee that he also felt bound
to follow the advice of a Company-appointed lawyer, even when it
conflicted with the judges’ determinations.302 More than four years after
the fact, he still could not articulate a coherent theory of how seriously
he ought to have taken the judges’ words.
American judges shared these concerns. Anxiety about the
nature of legal authority was part of the new republic’s inheritance.303
As a result, American judges also inherited the growing discomfort with
extrajudicial opinions. In 1787, for example, a Connecticut court
warned justices of the peace “to be cautious in declaring extra-judicial

296. Letter from the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. & Council (Oct. 19,
1776), Add. Ms. 16266, at 31r–31v (on file with the British Library). The justices later resumed
their private advice-giving, once colonial politics cooled down and it seemed that their letters would
“not be productive of mischief.” JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. & Council,
Copy of Parts of a Letter from the Judges to the Governour General and Council of Fort William
Containing Their Answers to the Questions Proposed by the President and Council of Fort St.
George (Oct. 30, 1777), Add. Ms. 38400, at 117r (on file with the British Library).
297. Supra notes 173–177 and accompanying text.
298. Minute from John Clavering & Philip Francis (June 23, 1777), in 12 BENGAL: PAST &
PRESENT, supra note 174, at 18, 18.
299. Letter from the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature to the Governor-Gen. & Council (June
24, 1777), in 12 BENGAL: PAST & PRESENT, supra note 174, at 26, 26.
300. Letter from Warren Hastings & Richard Barwell to the JJ. of the Sup. Ct. of Judicature
(June 24, 1777), in 12 BENGAL: PAST & PRESENT, supra note 174, at 27, 27.
301. REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON PETITIONS RELATIVE TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN INDIA (May 8, 1781), reprinted in REPORTS, supra note 154, at 1, 28.
302. Id. at 28–29.
303. See, e.g., Kempin, supra note 60, at 37–38; Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Article III’s
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
447, 476 & n.145 (1994) (arguing that stare decisis might not have been established in the United
States until the nineteenth century).
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opinions, lest an undue use should be made of them.”304 The judges of
most other states seem to have shared this concern.305
American judges also feared their old opinions might be used to
embarrass them. Consider the events leading up to Hayburn’s Case.306
In 1792, the judges of three circuit courts wrote to President
Washington about legislation that instructed them to review veterans’
pension claims. In one such letter, Justice Iredell and Judge John
Sitgreaves emphasized “the necessity of judges being in general
extremely cautious in not intimating an opinion in any case extrajudicially.”307 In part, they were worried that doing so might bias them
in future litigation. But they also feared embarrassment if they changed
their minds.308 “[I]f we can be convinced this opinion is a wrong one, we
shall not hesitate to act accordingly,” they insisted; “being as far from
the weakness of supposing that there is any reproach in having
committed an error, to which the greatest and best men are sometimes
liable.”309 This was a preemptive defense against the criticism they
might receive for appearing to flip-flop. In the politically charged
landscape of the 1790s—a time when the structure and role of the
federal judiciary were deeply contested310—judges simply lacked
confidence that their extrajudicial writings would be read in the
proper spirit.311

304. Wilson v. Hinkley, 1 Kirby 199, 201 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787) (per curiam).
305. See Letter from Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, Governor, New York (Mar. 21, 1801),
supra note 224, at 482 (noting Chancellor Livingston’s position). There were limited exceptions in
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. See infra Appendix.
306. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
307. Letter from James Iredell & John Sitgreaves to George Washington (June 8, 1792),
reprinted in Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 413 n.*.
308. Later judges were sometimes more explicit about their fear of humiliation. See, e.g., In re
Advisory Opinion, 169 S.E.2d 697, 700 (N.C. 1969) (“Otherwise, as justices . . . we may find
ourselves embarrassed by an advisory opinion given without the benefit of argument and briefs.”);
In re Requests to Judges in Chancery for Advisory Opinions, 137 A. 151, 151 (N.J. Ch. 1927)
(warning that an advisory opinion “may embarrass [a judge] immensely when the matter comes
before him officially”).
309. Letter from James Iredell & John Sitgreaves to George Washington (June 8, 1792), supra
note 307.
310. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 186 (2010)
(discussing reservations about the Judiciary Act of 1789).
311. Focusing on the potential misuse of advisory opinions also explains why some kinds of
extrajudicial activity disappeared while others survived. See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying
text. For example, because private advice was unlikely to circulate widely, it had less risk of being
misinterpreted by the public. Advice that judges gave to another court or in a quasi-appellate
capacity was also less likely to be misinterpreted, because in both situations, the advice would
eventually be linked to a judgment. Cf. A[rchibald] Macdonald, Opinion of the Attorney General
(Oct. 22, 1792), in 1 MCARTHUR, supra note 26, at 430, 432 (describing the capacity of judges to
“solemnly settle[ ]” the legality of court-martial verdicts).
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It’s unsurprising that the Justices didn’t mention these concerns
in the Correspondence itself. Their letter instead emphasized their right
to say no,312 while also invoking the classical concern with prejudging
cases.313 This was sufficient to justify their refusal, so there was no need
to add the more insulting argument that the president or the American
people could not be trusted to read an advisory opinion correctly.
Besides, if the Justices’ fundamental fear was that their writings might
be misread, they had every reason to keep their letter as short
as possible.
C. How the Correspondence Was Canonized
The Justices of 1793 meant to discourage the Washington
Administration from seeking advisory opinions, but they did not declare
them unconstitutional. How, then, was the Correspondence
transformed into a constitutional landmark?
First, let’s consider why the executive branch didn’t keep asking
for the Justices’ advice. The main reason was logistical: the early
Justices were in the capital for only a few weeks each year.314 The
Justices had made it clear that, like English judges, they wouldn’t give
opinions without an opportunity for in-person discussion.315
Furthermore, to the extent that the Administration hoped to use
opinions for political cover, their value would have been diminished
without a full set of signatures. As a result, judicial advice would
usually have taken weeks to obtain—even if the Justices had wanted to
give it.
The practical difficulties increased in 1794, when the President
sent the Chief Justice to London to negotiate what became known as
the Jay Treaty. By the time he returned to the United States in 1795,
he had been elected Governor of New York. Jay’s successor, John
Rutledge, denounced the Jay Treaty shortly after his nomination; his
ill-advised speech led the Senate to reject his nomination and some
observers to question his sanity.316 This was not someone whose opinion
President Washington was likely to solicit. The next Chief Justice,
Oliver Ellsworth, was more sound; but in 1799, he left on a mission to

312. See supra notes 201–209 and accompanying text.
313. This is what the judges seem to have meant when they said they were judges of a “court
in the last resort.” See Wheeler, supra note 184, at 152. Professor Casto suggests that this phrase
was meant to reinforce the Justices’ right to refuse by drawing an analogy to the House of Lords,
which did not issue advisory opinions. Casto, supra note 52, at 188–89.
314. See JAY, supra note 38, at 98–99; White, supra note 24, at 6–7.
315. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 214.
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France.317 Chief Justice Marshall, appointed in 1801, had the virtue of
remaining in the country; but his advice would have been uncongenial
to President Jefferson, his longtime antagonist, or to President
Madison, who thought that the Marshall Court already had too many
chances to say what the law is.318 President Monroe, elected in 1816,
was more interested in the Court’s views.319 But by then, the presidency
had functioned for nearly three decades without advisory opinions.
This was possible thanks to the advice-giving role of the attorney
general. As the Justices emphasized, the Constitution authorized the
president to require opinions from the heads of executive departments;
and the Judiciary Act of 1789 directed the attorney general “to give his
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the
President of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any
of the departments.”320 The first attorneys general had little prestige
and no supervisory authority—not even over U.S. Attorneys321—and
early occupants of the office seem to have viewed opinion-giving as a
rare chance to be useful.322 Like their English counterparts, American
attorneys general believed that their oaths obliged them to faithfully
expound the law—just like judges.323 Indeed, Attorney General William
Wirt described himself “as a judge, called to decide a question of law

317. See supra note 214.
318. See R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL OF AARON BURR: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE
CHARACTER WARS OF THE NEW NATION 46–47 (2012) (discussing Jefferson and Marshall’s “intense
dislike and distrust of one another”); Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819),
in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 500–04 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Mary Parke Johnson
& Anne Mandeville Colony eds., 2009) (Madison discussing his displeasure with the Court’s
“latitudinary mode of expounding the Constitution” in Marbury v. Madison).
319. David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 85–88
(2015). In 1822, President Monroe sent the Justices a pamphlet he had written about internal
improvements. Id. at 85. Three Justices replied; but although two of the letters offered some legal
commentary, the Court as a whole did not offer an advisory opinion. Id. at 85–88. Justice Johnson’s
letter purported to speak for the full Court; but, as Professor Schwartz shows, that wasn’t accurate.
Id. at 85–86. Justice Story expressly declined “to express any opinion.” Id. at 85. Accordingly, the
Justices’ replies were in the nature of private advice, not advisory opinions.
320. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93.
321. Edmund Randolph was paid less than the other members of the Cabinet; he didn’t have
his own office; and he couldn’t persuade Congress to pay for a single clerk. Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights
or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014).
322. When Jefferson learned of the Justices’ refusal, he asked Randolph “if we could not
prepare a bill for Congress to appoint a board or some other body of advice for the Executive on
such questions.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 220, at 651, 653. Randolph replied that “he should
propose to annex it to his office.” Id.
323. HAMBURGER, supra note 49, at 320–21; Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of
Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1471 (2010).
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with the impartiality and integrity which characterizes the judician.”324
Such a perspective allowed holders of that office to become increasingly
effective substitutes for judicial advisors.325 Analogous developments
facilitated the demise of advisory opinions in England326 and Bengal.327
Meanwhile, the prevailing understanding of the Justices’ actions
in 1793 had evolved. Initially, observers did not see the Correspondence
as announcing a constitutional principle. On receiving the Justices’
letter, Jefferson observed only that “they declined being consulted,” and
that English admiralty judges showed no such reluctance.328 A decade
later, however, Chief Justice Marshall offered a different gloss. In his
biography of George Washington, he described the Correspondence as
reflecting the Justices’ view that the Court was only “a legal tribunal
for the decision of controversies brought before them in legal form,” and
that it would be “improper to enter the field of politics, by declaring
their opinions on questions not growing out of the case before them.”329
Marshall apparently hadn’t seen the Justices’ letter,330 and it’s not clear
how he arrived at his interpretation.331 But it quickly became canonical.
Thomas Sergeant, a former justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
adopted Marshall’s explanation nearly verbatim in his treatise on
324. Shugerman, supra note 321, at 133 (quoting Letter from William Wirt to John C. Calhoun
(Feb. 3, 1820)).
325. See DAVID R. DEENER, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 22–24 (1957).
326. The attorney and solicitor general gradually gained prestige during the eighteenth
century. EDWARDS, supra note 218, at 279–80. By the end of the century, they remained servants
of the Crown, but they were no longer seen as totally subservient. See Oldham, supra note 77, at
172–73; see also GORDON H. WARREN, FOUNTAIN OF DISCONTENT: THE TRENT AFFAIR AND
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 99 (1981) (suggesting that the prime minister rightly relied “on the written
opinion of the law officers,” rather than the oral advice of the Lord Chancellor and an admiralty
judge, concerning a question of international law during the 1860s).
327. In 1776, the East India Company appointed Sir John Day as the first advocate general of
Bengal. J. Duncan M. Derrett, Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience, in CHANGING LAW IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 114, 134 (J.N.D. Anderson ed., 1963). Although he had been appointed
partly to represent the Council before the SCJ, his practice consisted mostly of rendering legal
opinions. JOHN DAY, STATE OF SIR JOHN DAY’S CLAIM UPON THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY 2
(London, 1787).
328. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), supra note 322.
329. 5 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 441 (Philadelphia, C.P.
Wayne 1804).
330. He didn’t quote the Correspondence, and he seemed to be guessing about its date.
Specifically, he was unsure whether it had been received when the Cabinet met on August 3. Id.
at 441–42. (The letter is dated August 8.) The Correspondence was only printed in 1891. Wheeler,
supra note 184, at 145 n.98.
331. Professor Steilen has argued that a new understanding of judging emerged in the 1790s,
which emphasized courts’ unique authority to expound laws through the nonpolitical process of
litigation. Matthew Steilen, Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding, 17 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 479, 561–67 (2014). Under this paradigm, various kinds of extrajudicial commentary,
including politicized grand jury charges and advisory opinions, came to seem at odds with judicial
office. Id. Marshall’s retelling of the Correspondence sounded similar themes.
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constitutional law.332 Justice Story, in turn, relied on Sergeant’s
treatise, in addition to Marshall’s biography, when making his own
pronouncement in 1833 that federal judges “cannot . . . be called upon
to advise the president in any executive measures; or to give
extrajudicial interpretations of law.”333 Marshall’s account, amplified by
Story’s treatise, became the basis of the standard view of federal judicial
power in the early twentieth century.334 Reformers continued
occasionally to call for a revival of advisory opinions, but at that point,
they were arguing for a practice that had been disfavored for more than
a century.335
CONCLUSION
The Jay Court’s famous refusal of 1793 was a pragmatic
response to growing anxiety about the nature of legal authority, not a
declaration that the Constitution barred advisory opinions. This
historical discovery has far-reaching implications. As Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky has observed, “justiciability doctrines exist largely to
ensure that federal courts will not issue advisory opinions.”336 One
might ask whether those doctrines need a new purpose.
Answering that question is work for another day, but it might be
helpful to suggest some points of departure. As an initial matter, this
Article does not argue that federal courts should get into the advice
business. Federal judges never had a duty to give advisory opinions;
and their long practice to the contrary has created a strong norm—and
perhaps even a constitutional rule—against starting now.337 Moreover,

332. THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BEING A VIEW OF THE PRACTICE AND
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF CONSTITUTIONAL POINTS DECIDED
375 (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 2d ed. 1830) (1822).
333. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 651
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). Story’s constitutional interpretation aligned with his broader
views about the proper role of the judiciary: in 1820, he led an effort to amend the Massachusetts
Constitution so as to eliminate its provision authorizing advisory opinions. JOURNAL OF DEBATES
AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF
MASSACHUSETTS 72 (Boston, The Daily Advertiser 1821); TOPF, supra note 18, at 35–36.
334. See United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 301 (1909) (quoting Marshall and citing Story);
see also Wheeler, supra note 184, at 145 (describing the adoption of Story’s account). Alexis de
Tocqueville further amplified Story’s perspective when he used the Commentaries as one of the
principal sources for his account of the American judiciary. See ANDRÉ JARDIN, TOCQUEVILLE: A
BIOGRAPHY 201–03 (Lydia Davis & Robert Hemenway trans., 1989) (describing Tocqueville’s
reliance on Story); 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 169–75 (Eduardo Nolla ed.,
James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2012) (1840). The first Supreme Court opinion to rely
directly on the Correspondence was Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
335. See infra Appendix.
336. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 54 (7th ed. 2016).
337. See supra note 15.
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the practical concerns that motivated the Jay Court persist. One might
think, in our more positivist legal culture, that it would be simple
enough for a court (or legislature) to make advisory opinions safe by
declaring them nonbinding. But the effort would almost certainly fail.338
Consider, for example, the debate about the precedential authority of
unpublished opinions.339 Indeed, we still can’t agree about the binding
scope of judicial decisions.340 Anxiety about legal authority still lurks,
even if it’s sometimes out of sight.341
To some extent, then, the status quo should persist, but on a new
conceptual footing. In fact, one advantage of this Article’s historical
argument is that we can make sense of practices that now seem
doctrinally dubious but practically irradicable. Consider the perennial
debate about whether federal courts ought to focus primarily on “law
declaration” or “dispute resolution.”342 In practice, of course, they do
both; but the Supreme Court has tended in recent years to privilege the
former.343 Regardless of whether that’s desirable, it creates a conceptual
problem. As several scholars have argued, a focus on law declaration
fits uneasily with the justiciability doctrines of standing, ripeness, and
mootness, which “rest on a dispute resolution model of adjudication.”344
But this apparent tension is less troubling once we recover the Court’s
historical reasons for avoiding extrajudicial advice. Their refusal to give
an advisory opinion—the decision that was the mother of all
justiciability doctrines—was itself a product of their desire to declare
338. See CARISSIMA MATHEN, COURTS WITHOUT CASES: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF ADVISORY
OPINIONS 213–21 (2019) (describing Canadian courts’ failure to distinguish between references
and ordinary cases); THAYER, supra note 211, at 58–59 (lamenting “a popular impression that
[advisory opinions in Massachusetts] are on the same footing as decisions in litigated cases”).
339. See, e.g., Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV. 705, 723
(2018); Andrea Pin & Francesca M. Genova, The Duty to Disclose Adverse Precedents: The Spirit
of the Common Law and Its Enemies, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 239, 261 & n.141 (2019); Norman R.
Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 761, 776–77 (2004).
340. See, e.g., RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 70–91
(2017); Adam N. Steinman, Case Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1947 (2017); Charles W. Tyler, The
Adjudicative Model of Precedent, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1551 (2020); Nina Varsava, Precedent on
Precedent, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 118 (2020).
341. Cf. Simpson, supra note 52, at 87 (“[W]hat is the authoritarian pecking order between a
decision of the American Supreme Court, dicta by the late Scrutton L.J., and an article by Pollock?
There are no rules to deal with conundrums of this sort.”); Robert C. Berring, Legal Information
and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1673, 1688–91 (2000) (arguing that the
fragmentation of legal authority in the late twentieth century contributed to the growing number
of split Supreme Court decisions).
342. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (2012).
343. Id.
344. Pushaw, supra note 303, at 453; accord Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 1191, 1222 (2011).
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the law more effectively. From that perspective, it becomes clear that
justiciability is about protecting law declaration, not just ensuring that
courts remain focused on resolving concrete disputes.
In one sense, the connection between justiciability and law
declaration is well known. Indeed, the Supreme Court has described the
utility of adversarial presentation as one of the chief arguments against
advisory opinions today.345 But that wasn’t what motivated the Jay
Court. As Part II showed, classical common-law judges had also
emphasized the benefits of adversarialism, and yet they continued to
give advisory opinions without it. What really pushed the Justices into
silence was their desire to avoid statements that might later distort the
law. That decision depended not on their perception of limited power
under Article III but on a prudential judgment about what their judicial
duty required. If that’s right, then it might be productive to revisit older
notions of justiciability, which saw the doctrine as a prudential tool
rather than an inexorable constitutional command.346
In some cases, such an approach might actually lead judges to
speak less—for example, by forgoing dicta that readers might be
tempted to take too seriously.347 The law now treats dicta as a kind of
loophole to the rule against advisory opinions; a more historically
grounded approach would allow us to think more forthrightly about the
similar kinds of problems they raise.348 At the same time, a more
historically sensitive approach might sometimes free judges from the
contortions required by an artificial avoidance of advisory opinions.349
This Article also makes a methodological intervention. Inquiries
into the original meaning of the Constitution, whether by self-described
originalists or otherwise, tend to draw a straight line from England to
345. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 72, at 1360 (“[T]he Supreme Court has treated decisions
rendered without full adversarial briefing as entitled to less precedential weight than decisions
rendered on fully developed records.”).
346. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 471–72 (2008)
(describing this older notion of standing).
347. Cf. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1249 (2006) (worrying that judges and lawyers too readily treat dicta as binding law).
348. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2006 (1994); Lee,
supra note 17, at 648–49; Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 654–56 (1995).
349. I tentatively suggest two possible applications. First, some scholars have suggested that
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance has been distorted by the perceived need to prevent courts
from issuing advisory opinions. See, e.g., Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation
and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1283–85 (2016); William K. Kelley, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 840–81 (2001).
Second, this Article suggests that courts in qualified-immunity cases need not worry that decisions
on the constitutional merits are prohibited by Article III. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J.
Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2015) (discussing this concern).
Of course, constitutionality is not the only concern, and prudential considerations might lead
courts to maintain their current practice.
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the early republic.350 To capture the Founders’ legal worldview, courts
and commentators typically look to canonical English texts like
Blackstone’s Commentaries or the practice of the Westminster courts,
and perhaps adding evidence from early American treatises or case
reports. This move is sometimes justifiable. For instance, the early
Supreme Court deliberately modeled its procedures on “the practice of
the courts of King’s Bench and Chancery in England.”351 It makes sense,
then, to examine those English courts to illuminate some aspects of
early federal procedure.352
In general, however, American lawyers saw themselves as
inheriting not the practice of specific courts but the common law itself—
a law that wasn’t tied to any particular jurisdiction.353 If what we’re
after is the eighteenth-century common law, then we should seek it
wherever it was administered, including British colonies that did not
become part of the United States. Of course, English materials will
often be the easiest ones to access; and there might be doctrinal reasons
to prefer the products of Westminster courts. But for some topics—such
as the behavior of a newly created supreme court—the study of colonial
legal materials offers an incomparable opportunity to understand the
nature of judging in the eighteenth century.
APPENDIX: EXTRAJUDICIAL STRAGGLERS
This Article has followed conventional wisdom in assuming that
English judges gave their last advisory opinion to the Crown in 1760.354

350. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2011) (summarizing and critiquing this view). Professors Pfander and Birk
have sought to broaden our perspective in a different way by emphasizing Scottish influences on
the Founders’ conception of judicial power. For other discussions of the importance of Scots law
and legal theory, see LACROIX, supra note 310, at 24–29, 87–88, 120–24; William Ewald, James
Wilson and the Scottish Enlightenment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1053, 1097–98 (2010); and James
E. Pfander, Standing To Sue: Lessons from Scotland’s Actio Popularis, 66 DUKE L.J. 1493 (2017).
351. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 (1792).
352. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 303, at 473 (examining English practice to consider the
definition of a “case”). Even early federal practice, however, sometimes looked not to specific
English courts but to broader concepts, such as “the principles, rules and usages which belong to
courts of equity and to courts of admiralty.” Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The
Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute,
101 VA. L. REV. 609, 653 (2015) (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276
(repealed 1872)).
353. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 52, at 937 & n.49 (“As Chancellor Taylor observed, . . . ‘it was
the common law we adopted, and not English decisions.’ ”); Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right,
95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1262–63 (2017).
354. The reporter of Sackville’s Case, a lawyer and member of Parliament named Robert
Henley Eden, described it in 1818 as “the last time that the crown has taken the opinion of the
judges extrajudicially.” Sackville’s Case (1760) 28 Eng. Rep. 940, 941; 2 Eden 371, 372 n. Later
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But reporting was irregular, and it’s possible that later specimens
exist.355 If one is found, what would that mean for this Article?
Not much. Its claim is merely that English judges tried to end
their advisory practice after 1760. That historians have assumed for
more than two centuries that advisory opinions ceased after that date
is good evidence that the practice at least became less frequent. But it
wouldn’t be surprising if judges continued to issue stray advisory
opinions in later years. Well into the nineteenth century, judges
continued to swear an oath to advise the king.356 If the Crown really
wanted an advisory opinion, it could get one.357
For the sake of building a complete historical record, this
Appendix considers an extrajudicial opinion that English judges gave
in 1785, which has so far escaped the attention of legal historians. The
matter began when Major General Charles Ross wrote a letter to a
London newspaper in which he attacked his former commander.358
George III and his cabinet agreed that Ross ought to be court-martialed
“for his having published a letter so derogatory to the honour of a
superior officer.”359 A court-martial duly assembled on March 3, at
which point its members raised doubts about their jurisdiction. Ross
was on “half-pay”—basically, in semiretirement—and it was unclear
whether half-pay officers were subject to military law.360 Accordingly,
the court-martial adjourned to get the judges’ opinion.361 The judges
were away on circuit; but on April 26, after they had returned, they
stated that neither Ross’s warrant as a general officer nor his
half-pay pension subjected him to military law.362 The court-martial
accordingly dissolved.
So far, this looks a lot like Sackville’s Case: an opinion from the
twelve judges about the jurisdiction of a court-martial, rendered at the

scholars have accepted this statement. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 49, at 508 n.2; Thayer,
supra note 211, at 46.
355. See JAY, supra note 38, at 149 n.120.
356. See OATH OF THE JUSTICES (1346), supra note 48.
357. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Dundas, Home Sec’y, to Lord Loughborough, C.J. of Common
Pleas (Sept. 12, 1792), supra note 21 (suggesting that the Crown had a “right to call for your
sentiments” upon a “formal Reference to the Judges”).
358. Charles Ross, For the Morning Herald, MORNING HERALD, Feb. 1, 1785, at 4, Gale, Doc.
No. GALEIZ2000919121.
359. Letter from George III to Lord Sydney (Feb. 2, 1760), in 1 THE LATER CORRESPONDENCE
OF GEORGE III 130 (A. Aspinall ed., 1962).
360. England, 47 SCOTS MAG., June 1785, at 303, 303. Some sources give the date as March 6.
E.g., Historical Chronicle for March, UNIVERSAL MAG. KNOWLEDGE & PLEASURE, March 1785, at
161, 162.
361. Court Martial, WHITEHALL EVENING POST, Mar. 5, 1785, at 3, Gale, Doc.
No. GALEIZ200169985.
362. Monthly Chronology, 4 LONDON MAG., May 1785, at 386, 386.
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outset of the proceeding. That’s mostly how it was reported in the
contemporary press,363 in parliamentary debates,364 and in nineteenthcentury treatises.365 But there are two reasons to hesitate before
revising the death-date of advisory opinions. First, it’s unclear what the
judges said. Their opinion was never printed, and at least one
contemporary—Prime Minister William Pitt—disagreed with those
other accounts. During a parliamentary debate, he invoked a reference
made to three judges (not twelve), who disagreed about the courtmartial’s jurisdiction (rather than agreeing unanimously).366 It’s
possible that he had in mind a different opinion, or that he was simply
mistaken. In any event, the ambiguity suggests that the opinion was
not widely available—and, perhaps, that it hadn’t been written down
at all. In other words, it’s possible that the judges only gave an
oral opinion.
Second, unlike in Sackville’s Case, members of Ross’s courtmartial seem to have contacted the judges directly, rather than going
through the King.367 Accordingly, the judges might have viewed the
request as coming from another court. As the Introduction explained,
judges treated those sorts of certified questions differently from advice
to the Crown.368 Accordingly, we can’t say definitively that English
judges gave an advisory opinion to the Crown after 1760—although it
wouldn’t be very surprising if they had done so.
It’s similarly unsurprising that advisory opinions survived in a
few states in the late eighteenth century.369 In Massachusetts, the
constitution adopted in 1780 authorized the legislative and executive
branches “to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial
court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.”370
Surviving sources shed little light on why the provision was included.371
363. See, e.g., Chronicle, in ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND
LITERATURE, FOR THE YEARS 1784 AND 1785, at 222, 230–31 (J. Dodsley ed., 1786).
364. See, e.g., 20 PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 18 (Mar. 21, 1786) (statement of Viscount
Stormont). Some commentators didn’t specify the number of judges but stated that their opinion
was unanimous. See, e.g., id. at 20 (statement of Lord Loughborough). Loughborough, the chief
justice of Common Pleas, had been one of the judges to join the opinion.
365. See, e.g., DELAFONS, supra note 26, at 63; 1 MCARTHUR, supra note 26, at 195–96; see also
A Case of Hardship, 77 LANCET 617, 618 (1861) (referring to “the decision of the twelve judges in
the case of General Ross”).
366. 19 PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 381 (Mar. 16, 1786) (statement of William Pitt).
367. See Principal Occurrences, in The NEW ANNUAL REGISTER, OR GENERAL REPOSITORY OF
HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR THE YEAR 1785, at 3, 20 (London, G.G.J. & J. Robinson
1786) (reporting correspondence between the members of the court-martial and the Chief Baron
of the Exchequer).
368. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
369. See JAY, supra note 38, at 54–56.
370. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 3, art. 2, amended by MASS. CONST. art. 75.
371. TOPF, supra note 18, at 8–12.
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It’s possible that its author, John Adams,372 had in mind his own
experience during the Stamp Act crisis, when he found it politically
useful to pressure colonial judges for an opinion.373 New Hampshire
copied the Massachusetts provision in 1784.374 These provisions were
rarely used.375 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was more active in
giving advisory opinions during the 1780s, but the practice there seems
to have depended largely on the leadership of Chief Justice Thomas
McKean, and it died out after the state adopted a new constitution
in 1790.376
Attitudes toward advisory opinions continued to change during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the 1820s and 1920s seem to
have been times of especially vigorous debate. On the one hand, there
were efforts to revive or expand the practice in various British and
American jurisdictions.377 On the other hand, critics of advisory
opinions developed new arguments against them.378 Those
developments lie beyond the scope of this Article, but they merit
investigation in future work.

372. The Report of a Constitution or Form of Government for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Boston, 1779, 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS: MARCH 1779 – FEBRUARY 1780, supra note
183, at 232, 257 n.124.
373. See supra note 183.
374. TOPF, supra note 18, at 17–18.
375. Id. at 29.
376. JOHN M. COLEMAN, THOMAS MCKEAN: FORGOTTEN LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION 224–26
(1975); ALBERT RUSSELL ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COÖPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT 64–
65 (1918); John M. Coleman, Thomas McKean and the Origin of an Independent Judiciary, 34 PA.
HIST. 111, 125 (1967). In 1807, when McKean was governor, the legislature directed the justices
to prepare a report about “which of the English statutes are in force in this Commonwealth, and
which of those statutes in their opinion ought to be incorporated into” Pennsylvania statutory law.
An Act Enjoining Certain Duties on the Judges of the Supreme Court, 3 Binney 594 (1807). The
judges complied; but their work product looks more like a research report than an advisory opinion.
See REPORT OF THE JUDGES, in 3 REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA 595, 595–98 (Horace Binney ed., 1808).
377. See, e.g., D.B. Swinfen, Politics and the Privy Council: Special Reference to the Judicial
Committee, 23 JURID. REV. (N.S.) 126 (1978).
378. See, e.g., TOPF, supra note 18, at 29–39 (highlighting arguments that advisory opinions
encourage political abuse); Note, The Advisory Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, 5
FORDHAM L. REV. 94, 94–95 (1936) (discussing a proposed amendment to the Constitution that
would have allowed for advisory opinions); supra note 333 and accompanying text (highlighting
Joseph Story’s opinion that it is improper for the judicial branch to act as an advisor to another
branch of government). Compare Manley O. Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and
International Courts, 37 HARV. L. REV. 970 (1924) (arguing for the utility of advisory opinions),
with Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 1008 (critiquing Hudson and describing advisory opinions as
“ghosts that slay”).

